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The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is part of China’s “One 
Belt, One Road” initiative and joins two major economic corridors: The Silk Road 
Economic Belt and Southeast Asian Maritime Silk Road. CPEC is part of China’s 
regionalism and economic cooperation in South Asia. It will include energy 
projects, infrastructure development, industrialization, and the expansion and 
improvement of the Gwadar Port. The project has great potential for Pakistan, 
both economically and regionally. CPEC faces serious challenges on both 
internal and regional fronts, however. This thesis will examine CPEC in two 
ways: through a cost/benefit analysis of the proposed project and a comparison 
of the project to two other economic corridors, the Suez and Panama Canals. 
This analysis suggests that CPEC potentially could boost Pakistan’s economy, 
making it a regional economic hub. Whether this will happen depends upon the 
effective and timely completion of the project, the ensuring of transparency, and 
efficiency. Furthermore, if Pakistan is able to methodically ensure that the terms 
and conditions of CPEC are aligned with Pakistan’s national interests, Pakistan 
will likely receive maximum benefits from CPEC and, at the same time, avoid the 
pitfalls that Egypt and Panama experienced at the hands of investing foreign 
powers.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has become the mega 
project of regionalism in South Asia, and many hope it will have great economic 
benefit for the Pakistani economy.
1
 China and Pakistan mutually agreed upon 
CPEC during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Pakistan in April 2015. 
CPEC is a component of the Chinese “One Belt, One Road” initiative, which 
connects China through trade routes with Asia, Europe, and Africa. The key 
aspects of CPEC are an economic corridor, development of a deep-water port on 
the Arabian Sea in the southwestern city of Gwadar, energy plants, needed 
infrastructure, and industrialization.
2
 Total Chinese investment in CPEC will be 
approximately $46 billion, which is the equivalent of approximately 20 percent of 
Pakistan’s GDP.
3
 Construction of the project is planned in three phases, with 
completion slated for 2030. Besides being a transit corridor, CPEC is planned as 
an economic corridor to accrue maximum economic benefits to Pakistan 
regarding energy, industry, trade, and new business opportunities.
4
 CPEC is 
expected to attract foreign investment, which should boost Pakistan’s exports, 
increase its GDP, and bring improvement in health and basic amenities.
5
 As they 
progress ahead, the projects associated with CPEC will attract more foreign 
                                            
1 Siegfried O. Wolf, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: An Assessment of Its Feasibility 
and Impact on Regional Cooperation,” South Asia Democratic Forum (SADF), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2834599. 
2 Wolf, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,” 8.  
3 Andrew Stevens, “Pakistan Lands $46 Billion Investment from China,” CNN Money, April 
20, 2015, http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/20/news/economy/pakistan-china-aid-infrastucture/.  
4 Sutinder Singh, and John Mohd Magray, “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Its 
Impacts on Pakistan Economy,” International Journal of Innovative Research and Advanced 
Studies (IJIRAS) 4, no. 7 (July 2017): 6–9, http://www.ijiras.com/2017/Vol_4-
Issue_7/paper_2.pdf.  
5 Singh and Magray, “CPEC Impacts on Pakistan Economy,” 9.  
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direct investment (FDI) from China, benefiting the economy in the medium term.
6
 
At $46 billion, CPEC is China’s biggest FDI in Pakistan. Of that investment, $34 
billion will be used to construct hydro-, solar- and coal-powered plants that will 
generate 17,000 megawatts of electricity, with $12 billion dedicated for 
infrastructure development, including transport, optical fiber, pipelines, Gwadar 
Port, and the establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs).
7
  
Most governments and scholars believe that this project will greatly benefit 
Pakistan. Against this backdrop, this thesis seeks to address the benefits and the 
costs of this project for Pakistan. It will do so by presenting and analyzing the 
arguments for and against CPEC, as well as an overview of hurdles that will be 
faced, and some of the myths and realities associated with CPEC. The thesis will 
also compare CPEC with two other well-known economic corridors: the Suez and 
Panama canals. I have selected these foreign-funded projects for comparison 
with CPEC in order to ascertain the economic benefits Pakistan claims it will 
achieve as Egypt and Panama achieved from their canals in the past. 
Pakistani policymakers have identified successful completion of the CPEC 
as a significant national interest. Identifying and pursuing national interest is of 
paramount importance for achieving national goals. Robert J. Art writes in A 
Grand Strategy for America: 
The most fundamental task in devising a grand strategy is to 
determine a nation’s national interests. Once they are identified, 
they drive a nation’s foreign policy and military strategy; they 
determine the basic direction that it takes, the types and amounts of 
resources that it needs, and the manner in which the state must 
employ them to succeed. Because of the critical role that national 
                                            
6 “World Bank, 2016, Pakistan Development Update, November 2016: Making Growth 
Matter.” World Bank, Washington, DC. © World Bank, License: CC BY 3.0 IGO,  
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/25358  
7 Muhammad Saqib Irshad, Qi Xin, and Hamza Arshad. “One Belt and One Road: Dose [sic] 
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Benefit for [sic] Pakistan’s Economy?’ Journal of Economics 
and Sustainable Development 6, no.24 (2015): 200–207, http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/
resources/MI_Portal/Article/obor/2016/04/474089/1460080496674_SSRNid2710352.pdf 
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Ingrained infrastructural and energy issues have hindered Pakistan’s 
economic progression. Many see CPEC as a means for addressing the power 
and infrastructural worries and enriching Pakistan’s economy.  
Pakistan shares a border with China and has access to the sea: with 
CPEC, Pakistan and China have opened a new international trade route.9 This 
geographical significance of Pakistan may bear fruit in the future as the CPEC 
project progresses.  
Pakistan faces many challenges that could hinder CPEC’s progress, on 
the geopolitical and regional fronts. Successful and timely completion mainly 
depends on overcoming challenges met. India is concerned about CPEC’s 
northern route, which plans to run through Jammu and Kashmir.10 India also sees 
the Chinese navy in the Arabian Sea as a likely disruption in Indo-U.S. strategic 
cooperation.
11
 Iran sees the development of Gwadar Port as a rival to its own 
Chah Bahar Port, which it is developing with India’s support.12 In the domestic 
domain, concerns include transparency and political consensus. The most 
considerable worry is law and order, however, mainly since Gwadar, which is the 
gateway to CPEC, is in Baluchistan, where an unstable law-and-order situation is 
                                            
8 Robert J. Art, A Grand Strategy for America (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University 
Press, 2003), 45.  
9 Ayaz Gul, “Pakistan, China Jointly Open New International Trade Route,” Voice of America 
(blog) accessed on October 8, 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-china-jointly-open-
new-international-trade-route/3596644.html.    
10 Dhrubajyoti Bhattacharjee, “China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC),” Indian Council of 
World Affairs (Issue Brief), May 12, 2015, 5, 
http://www.icwa.in/pdfs/IB/2014/CPECIB12052015.pdf.  
11 Maryam Nazir, “Macro and Micro Dividends of CPEC,” Islamabad Policy Research 
Institute, November 1, 2016, http://www.ipripak.org/macro-and-micro-dividends-of-cpec-efforts-of-
regional-and-international-players-to-disrupt-the-development-in-the-region-its-ramifications-and-
rectifications.  




 China’s huge investment may likely increase its influence on 
Pakistan’s policies. If Pakistan is able to ensure the terms and conditions of 
CPEC meticulously, they will likely get maximum benefits out of CPEC and at the 
same time, they will not face what Egypt and Panama experienced from the 
foreign-funded Suez and Panama Canals. 
CPEC is perceived as equally imperative for China as it is for Pakistan. 
China is not the primary focus of my thesis, however. China is the world’s largest 
oil importer from Africa and the Gulf States, and this mega project provides 
routes to guarantee its energy security.
14
 CPEC will allow China to bypass 
maritime routes in East Asia that might be blocked during a war.
15
 Besides 
securing its trade route, China aims to develop its neglected western regions and 
wants more business for Chinese companies.
16
 In the regional domain, CPEC, 
when implemented, may likely increase China’s role as a regional power.
17
 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION  
CPEC is a major infrastructural project with a wide potential for changing 
the course of economic growth and geopolitics in Asia. China and Pakistan hope 
for the attainment of CPEC objectives despite impediments in the current 
                                            
13 Ali, “China Pakistan Economic Corridor: Prospects and Challenges for Regional 
Integration,” 4. 
14 Dhrubajyoti, “China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC),” 6.  
15 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on April 20, 2015, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1256093.shtml.  
16 Christopher K. Johnson, “President Xi Jinping’s ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative,” Center for 
Strategic & International Studies, last modified March 2016, https://csis-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160328_Johnson_PresidentXiJinping_Web.pdf.    
17 Louis Ritzinger, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Regional Dynamics and China’s 
Geopolitical Ambitions,” The National Bureau of Asian Research, last modified August 5, 2015, 
http://www.nbr.org/downloads/pdfs/psa/Commentary_Ritzinger_080515.pdf; Bhattacharjee, 
“China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC),” 11; Daniel Twining, “As the U.S. Pivots Away, 
China Bets on Pakistan,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, last modified April 23, 2015, 
www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-26-us-pivots-away-china-bets-pakistan. 
 5
environments. Against this backdrop, this thesis asks the following: How much 
will the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) benefit Pakistan?    
B. RATIONALE  
CPEC’s anticipated benefits for Pakistan depend on effective and timely 
completion against all challenges. CPEC has found its way from Chinese 
strategy of ‘One Belt, One Road’ and regionalism in South Asia.
18
 This modern 
initiative is China’s connection through trade routes with other parts of the world. 
Pakistan anticipates that CPEC may boost its economy and transform it into an 
economic hub. It also shows that China and Pakistan are not just friends but 
close allies.
19
 Rafi Amna Ejaz agrees that it is a valuable economic opportunity 
for Pakistan, where Pakistan will elevate its undeveloped areas into fully 
developed industrial zones, attract foreign investment, and address the important 
energy issue.
20
 Claude admits that these economic benefits are not restricted to 
Pakistan alone; CPEC will potentially benefit other neighboring countries such as 
Afghanistan, India, and Iran. Gwadar Port will likely become the gateway of 
CPEC. CPEC aims at infrastructural development through the network of roads, 
education, energy, and cultural development.
21
 
China will be likely to benefit immensely from CPEC, both economically 
and politically. China will secure its trade routes and bypass any attempt by 
Western navies to block and encircle it. CPEC will considerably reduce the 
distance between China and other countries for oil and other imports and 
exports. In the regional domain, CPEC will likely provide a launching pad for 
China to emerge as a regional power in the future and flex the muscles of its 
                                            
18 Wolf, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,” 17.  
19 Ibid., 18. 
20 Amna Ejaz Rafi, "Chinese President Visit to Pakistan,” IPRI Review, Islamabad Policy 
Research Institute (IPRI), Islamabad, (2016), http://www.ipripak.org/chinese-president-visit-to-
pakistan/.  
21 Claude, “Pakistan—the Pivot to China,” Defence Journal; Karachi 18.11  (Jun 2015): 70–
71, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/in-the-news/rakisits-pakistan-s-pivot-to-china. 
 6
naval presence in the Arabian Sea. On the internal front, China desires to 
develop its underdeveloped Western regions by making CPEC its “Five Year 
Plan for Economic and Social Development.” 
C. BACKGROUND  
This thesis examines whether CPEC will benefit Pakistan’s economy in 
the way that the Suez and Panama Canals benefited Egypt and Panama, 
respectively. I have examined the scholarly work on CPEC, but as the topic is 
new, no books are available on it. Articles published in academic journals, 
reports, and different studies elaborate on the importance of this mega project, 
however,22 scholars have made arguments both for and against the project; 
many feel that CPEC will provide a boost to Pakistan’s economy, and they view 
CPEC as a long-term integration among the countries of the region.23 Others 
view it as a launching pad for China as a regional power.24 Still others point to the 
highest rate of the interest on CPEC’s loans and worry that this will be a burden 
on Pakistan’s economy in the future.25 This thesis will examine both the costs 
and the benefits of CPEC by analyzing the following areas. 
1. CPEC Economic Benefits  
Many scholars have highlighted how Pakistanis are really interested in 
what Pakistan will gain from this project. Siegfried Wolf considers CPEC to be a 
                                            
22 Daniel S. Markey, and James West, “Behind China’s Gambit in Pakistan,” Council on 
Foreign Relations, last modified May 12, 2016, 5, http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/behind-chinas-
gambit-pakistan/p37855. 
23 Waheed Ali, Li Gang, and Mohsin Raza, “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Current 
Developments and Future Prospect for Regional Integration,” International Journal of Research 
03, no. 10 (2016): 220, https://internationaljournalofresearch.com/list-of-volumes/volume-
3_2016/vol-3_issue-10_june_2016.  
24 Louis Ritzinger, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Regional Dynamics and China’s 
Geopolitical Ambitions,” The National Bureau of Asian Research, last modified August 5, 2015, 
http://www.nbr.org/downloads/pdfs/psa/Commentary_Ritzinger_080515.pdf. 
25 Salman Siddiqui, “Pakistan Will be Paying China $90b against CPEC-related Projects,” 
The Express Tribune, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1352995/pakistan-will-paying-china-90b-cpec-
related-projects/.  
 7
game changer for Pakistan as well as a means to attain national consensus and 
harmony between Pakistan and its neighbors. He concludes on the importance of 
peace for completion of CPEC projects that peace brings development, not 
development brings peace.26 Gordon Chang agrees with Wolf that CPEC will 
attract foreign capital and boost the economy.27 Mehar argues the economic 
benefits of CPEC and notes that Pakistan cannot enhance its volume of exports 
without the development of infrastructure, and that foreign investment in the 
manufacturing sector is directly proportional to the supporting facilities in the 
country.28 Amna Rafi argues that CPEC’s economic dividends will reach the more 
backward regions of Pakistan and eradicate poverty in the rural areas.29 Singh 
and John also concludes that CPEC energy projects would address the energy 
shortcomings of the country.
30
 Huang et al. also note that Pakistan’s socio-
economic development is directly linked to the availability of energy and CPEC 
will resolve the energy issue of Pakistan.31 Stevens supports this argument and 
concludes that CPEC’s significant investment in the energy sector may provide a 
way out of Pakistan’s energy crisis.32 A World Bank study notes that as the 
CPEC projects move ahead, there will be more FDI flows from China to Pakistan, 
and FDI will bear fruit in the medium term.33 Sutinder Singh and John Magray 
argue that the 29 industrial parks proposed as part of CPEC would play a vital 
                                            
26 Wolf, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,” 46. 
27 Chang, Gordon, “China Big Plans for Pakistan, the National Interest,” December 10, 2014, 
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-big-plans-pakistan-11827  
28 Ayub Mehar, “Infrastructure Development, CPEC and FDI in Pakistan: Is There Any 
Connection?” Transnational Corporations Review 9, no. 3 (2017): 232–241, 3.  
29 Rafi, "Chinese President Visit to Pakistan,” IPRI Review, Islamabad Policy Research 
Institute (IPRI), Islamabad. 
30 Singh and Magray, “CPEC Impacts on Pakistan Economy,” 6. 
31 Bwo-Nung Huang, Jeng Hwang Ming, and Wei Yang Chin, “The Causal Relationship 
between Energy Consumption and GDP Growth Revisited: A Dynamic Panel Data Approach,” 
Ecological Economics, 67, (August 2008), 41–54. 
32 A. Stevens, “Pakistan Lands $46 Billion Investment from China, Money, April 20, 2015. 
33 “World Bank, “Pakistan Development Update, November 2016: Making Growth Matter.” 
World Bank, Washington, DC. © World Bank, 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/25358 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.  
 8
role in the industry and trade sectors.34 Muhammad Saqib Irshad, Qi Xin, and 
Hamza Arshad determine that CPEC potentially will benefit Pakistan’s 
economy.35 Waqas, Shahzad, and Mumtaz support the importance of CPEC for 
supply-chain management since it offers a much shorter trade route between the 
Arabian Sea and Western China.36 Ahsan Iqbal, Pakistan’s Minister of Interior 
and Minister for Planning, Development and Reforms, stresses the importance of 
CPEC, arguing that its completion is needed and a revival of the economy is 
essential to undo the past mistakes.37 While some sources have warned that 
CPEC bears similarities to the East India Company, which would not be positive 
for Pakistan, Khurran Hussain calls this comparison specious, since CPEC has 
no element of force and no intentions for foreign control of Pakistan.38 
2. Downside and Challenges to CPEC  
Some scholars have argued against CPEC and underlined the downside. 
For example, Munir Ahmad concludes that due to the extensive construction 
associated with the project, Pakistan will have to face a considerable amount of 
environmental damage.
39
 Hussain concludes that, contrary to the government of 
Pakistan’s claims about infrastructural and energy development, CPEC actually 
aims to foster Chinese enterprise and its main interest is in agriculture, large 
                                            
34 Singh and Magray, “CPEC Impacts on Pakistan Economy,” 7. 
35 Muhammad Saqib Irshad, Qi Xin, and Hamza Arshad. “One Belt and One Road: Dose 
[sic] China-Pakistan Economic Corridor benefit for [sic] Pakistan,3”  
36 Waqas, Shahzad, and Mumtaz, “Application of Lean-Agile Resilient Green Paradigm 
Framework on China Pakistan Economic Corridor: A Case Study,” Mehran University Research 
Journal of Engineering & Technology, Volume 36, No. 3, July, 2017 [p-ISSN: 0254–7821, e-ISSN: 
2413–7219], accessed on October 10, 2017 632, 
http://publications.muet.edu.pk/research_papers/pdf/pdf1573.pdf.  
37 Ahsan Iqbal, “Debunking myths on CPEC,” The Express Tribune, May 25, 2017, 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1418270/debunking-myths-cpec/.  
38 Khurram Husain, “CPEC: Is there cause for alarm?“ Dawn News Updated March 16, 
2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1320670.  
39 Munir Ahmed, “Flipside of CPEC coin” Daily Times, 16-May-17, http://ysiddaqui.com/flip-
side-of-cpec-coin-by-munir-ahmed-in-daily-times-16-may-17/.  
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cities surveillance systems, and visa-free entry.
40
 Khaliq concludes that 
Pakistan’s debt is gradually increasing, and by the year 2019–20, it may rise from 
its current $73 billion to $110 billion because of CPEC loans.
41
  
Some scholars have highlighted both regional and international challenges 
to CPEC, and concluded that stability in Pakistan’s law and order situation is the 
key to success for CPEC projects. For example, Thomas Zimmerman argues 
that CPEC’s success is linked with stability and security along the routes and 
security within China from threats like the Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM).42 
Li Xiguanget et al. note that India’s opposition to the project is one of the major 
problems that Pakistan faces.
43
 Akbar notes that Afghanistan’s volatile security 




3. Geopolitical Implications 
Scholars have also highlighted the geopolitical implications of CPEC. For 
instance, in his article “Pakistan: The Pivot of China,” Claude discusses Chinese 
investment and interest in the region in the time after NATO departs from 
Afghanistan. He concludes that defense collaboration between Pakistan and 
China will be strengthened with Gwadar Port.45 Parveen and Khalil note that 
China’s anticipated benefits will not only be in the economic sphere, but also in 
                                            
40 Khurram Husain, “Exclusive: CPEC master plan revealed,” Dawn News, Updated Jun 21, 
2017, 02:17 pm, https://www.dawn.com/news/1333101.  
41 Abdul Khaliq, CPEC—“A “game-changer” or another “East India Company”?” CADTM – 
Pakistan, http://www.cadtm.org/Pakistan-CPEC-A-game-changer-or.  
42 Zimmerman, “The New Silk Roads: China, the U.S., and the future of Central Asia” 
October 2015. http://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/zimmerman_new_silk_road_final_2.pdf. 
43 Li Xiguanget al., China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: A Game Changer, 3-11. 
44 Akber Ali, “China Pakistan Economic Corridor: Prospects and Challenges for Regional 
Integration,” Arts Social Sciences Journal 7, no. 204 (2016): 1-5, doi: 10.4172/2151-
6200.1000204. 
45 Claude, “Pakistan—the Pivot to China,” Defence Journal; Karachi 18.11  (Jun 2015): 70–
71, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/in-the-news/rakisits-pakistan-s-pivot-to-china. 
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the regional and strategic benefits.46 Ahmad Malik et al. note that China imports 
about 47 percent of its crude oil from the Persian Gulf and Iran; once CPEC has 
been developed, Gwadar Port will provide a safer, shorter, and economical route 
to western China.47 Ammad Hassan concludes that Gwadar Port, the gateway to 
CPEC, will become a main port for China and central Asia.48 Akber Ali notes that 
CPEC will both provide a secure alternate trade route for China and help 
Pakistan to counter India’s influence in the region.49 
A few writers have expressed concern about CPEC as furthering Chinese 
increased presence in the Indian Ocean and raised concerns for India in the 
future.50 For example, Bhattacharjee has highlighted Indian concerns as per their 
claim that CPEC plans to run through Jammu and Kashmir.51 According to Lim, 
India is concerned that CPEC’s passage through disputed territory will provide 
legitimacy to Pakistan’s claim of these areas.52 Muhammad Daim argues that 
India is very much hand-in-glove with Iran and is building an alternate route to 
Afghanistan and central Asia by developing Iran’s port of Chah Bahar in the Gulf 
of Oman.53 Jamal has highlighted Iran’s concerns that Gwadar Port will become 
a rival to its port at Chah Bahar.54 Massarrat and Ayesha agree that India 
                                            
46 Saima Perveen, and Jehanzeb Khalil, "Gwadar-Kashgar economic corridor: Challenges 
and imperatives for Pakistan and China," Journal of Political Studies 22, no. 2 (February 2015): 
351.  
47 Ahmad Rashid Malik et al., China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: A Game Changer, 
(Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies, 2016), 121. 
48 Ammad Hasan, “Pakistan’s Gwadar port’s prospects of economic revival,” Monterey: 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2005, https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/2138.  
49 Akber Ali, “China Pakistan Economic Corridor: Prospects and Challenges for Regional 
Integration,” 1–5. 
50 Markey, “Behind China’s Gambit in Pakistan,” 7. 
51 Bhattacharjee, “China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)” ICWA Issue Brief, 12 May 
2015, 2, www.icwa.in. 
52 Alvin Cheng-Hin Lim, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor One Year On—Analysis,” 
Eurasia Review, May 16, 2016, http://www.eurasiareview.com/16052016-the-china-pakistan-
economic-corridor-one-year-on-analysis/.  
53 Muhammad Daim Fazil, “5 Reasons Gwadar Port Trumps Chabahar,” Diplomat, June 9, 
2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/5-reasons-gwadar-port-trumps-chabahar.  
54 Jamal, “China Pakistan Economic Corridor,” 18. 
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perceives China as the primary obstacle to its trade with Afghanistan and other 
countries.55 Markey sees a Chinese naval influence and presence in the Arabian 
Sea as a matter of concern for India.56  
One aspect that is missing from the scholarly analysis of CPEC’s potential 
advantages and disadvantages is any comparison with existing transit routes and 
the economic impact they have had on their respective countries. Such a 
comparison would be valuable in predicting CPEC’s potential costs and benefits 
for Pakistan. Therefore, I will examine the Suez and Panama Canals in order to 
see what lessons they might offer to CPEC from an economic and strategic 
perspective. 
D. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
I developed this thesis on two axes. The first one is research-based, 
analyzing the benefits of CPEC regarding Pakistan. The second is inference-
based, comparing CPEC with the Suez Canal and Panama Canal.   
In answering the question, this thesis begins with the hypothesis that 
Pakistan will benefit economically from CPEC. Presently, Pakistan is facing an 
energy crisis, infrastructure quandaries, unemployment, economic deficits, a lack 
of foreign investment, and security concerns. I seek to determine whether—
although China is investing for its own interests—the project will also benefit 
Pakistan. I also explore whether CPEC will benefit Pakistan similarly to how the 
Suez Canal and Panama Canal benefited Egypt and Panama. Like Egypt and 
Panama, Pakistan will be a transit country.  
                                            
55 Massarrat Abid and Ayesha Ashfaq, “CPEC: Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan,” 
Pakistan Vision 16, no 2 (2015): 159, http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/studies/PDF-FILES/Artical-
7_v16_2_2015.pdf.  
56 Markey, “Behind China’s Gambit in Pakistan,” 7.  
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E. METHODS AND SOURCES  
I use qualitative research in my thesis. First, it covers the details of CPEC, 
including various aspects of planned infrastructure, energy projects, and 
proposed economic zones inside Pakistan and hurdles for Pakistan. Second, it 
addresses the costs and benefits of CPEC for Pakistan. Third, it compares CPEC 
to the Suez and Panama Canals to substantiate its professed economic benefits 
for Pakistan’s economy. 
The research in this thesis is drawn from open sources, including articles 
in newspapers, journals, and blogs. It has no access to the detailed official 
agreement between Pakistan and China for analysis and clarification. It has been 
kept updated with the inclusion of the latest changes in the project. To validate 
the argument and make the thesis authentic, sources of different scholars from 
different countries have been consulted.  
F. THESIS OUTLINE  
The thesis comprises five chapters. Chapter I has included the 
introduction, literature review and hypothesis, setting the foundation for this 
thesis. Chapter ll covers the details of CPEC, including various aspects of 
planned infrastructure, distribution of funds, routes and constraints faced in both 
external and internal domains. Chapter lll covers the costs and benefits of CPEC, 
as well as some of the myths associated with the project. Chapter IV is a 
comparative analysis of the Suez and Panama Canals with the future of CPEC 
and its perceived future economic benefits for Pakistan. The thesis concludes in 








II. THE CHINA-PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR AND 
HURDLES FOR PAKISTAN 
There is a tide in the affairs of men, which taken at the flood, leads 
on to fortune. Omitted, all the voyage of their life is bound in 
shallows and in miseries. On such a full sea are we now afloat. And 
we must take the current when it serves, or lose our ventures. 
—William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar
57
 
A. CHINA-PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR 
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a significant component 
of the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) Initiative, which connects China through a 
trade route with Asia, Europe, and Africa and is also known as the New Silk 
Road Economic Development Corridor.
58
 With CPEC, China will invest $46 billion 
mainly on the economic corridor, Gwadar Port, energy plants, infrastructure 
development, and the industrialization of economically-deprived areas.
59
 China 
considers CPEC its flagship project, as Pakistan is the nexus of two major 
economic corridors: The Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the Southeast 
Asian Maritime Silk Road.
60
 Despite CPEC’s significance, there are challenges 
to Pakistan on both its external and internal fronts. Externally, challenges 
include the concerns of India, the instability in Afghanistan, the interests of 
Iran,
61
 and the potential influence that China could exert on Pakistan’s foreign 
and economic policy with huge investments. Internally, weak law and order 
situations in different areas of Pakistan and the political concerns of all of 
                                            
57 Shakespeare: Julius Caesar: Act 4, Scene 3, 11. 
58 Wolf, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,” 8. 
59 Ibid. 
60
 Markey, “Behind China’s Gambit in Pakistan,” 7. 
61 Louis Ritzinger, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Regional Dynamics and China’s 
Geopolitical Ambitions,” National Bureau of Asian Research, last modified August 5, 2015, 
http://www.nbr.org/downloads/pdfs/psa/Commentary_Ritzinger_080515.pdf. 
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Pakistan’s political parties appear to be the primary hurdles. This chapter 
provides an overall view of CPEC and the challenges it faces in Pakistan.  
1. What Is an Economic Corridor?  
Currently in the scholarly world, there is no definition of an economic 
corridor. It is a developing idea,62 involving a number of different characteristics 
distributed among economic corridors.63 First, economic corridors are an 
emerging concept of global trade routes implemented for strategic development. 
Second, they are the focus of various countries and regions.64 They are often 
seen as potentially increasing economic growth in some areas.65 Moreover, 
infrastructural development, transportation facilities, and electricity are the pre-
conditions for a successful economic corridor.66 Economic corridors tend to 
benefit rural areas and link them through transportation and infrastructural 
development.67  
Wolf summarizes the essential requirements of economic corridors in 
terms of their economic, organizational, institutional, behavioral, political, and 
planning aspects.68 First, a growth zone is identified based on economic 
                                            
62 Hans-Peter Brunner , What Is Economic Corridor Development and What Can It Achieve 
in Asia’s Subregions? (August 6, 2013). Asian Development Bank Economics Working Paper 
Series No. 117, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2306801. 
63 Wolf, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,” 4. 
64 Safitri, H. “Economic Corridor Policy, Land Concentration and ‘social Exclusion’: Java’s 
Economic Corridor Policy Implementation, Indonesia.” Agricultural and Rural Development 
(ARD), 2012, http://hdl.handle.net/2105/13083. 
65 AGIL, (2000), Zona Paz Economic Corridor Strategy. Abt Association Inc., Guatemala-
CAP Income Generation Activities Project. Guatemala: Abt Association Inc., 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnacy158.pdf. 
66 François Bafoil, and Lin Ruiwen, "Re-examining the role of transport infrastructure in 
trade, regional growth and governance: Comparing the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) and 
Central Eastern Europe (CEE)," Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 29, no. 2 (February 
2010): 73-119. 
67 Masami Ishida and Ikumo Isono, Old, New and Potential Economic Corridor in the 
Mekong Region,” in Emerging Corridors in the Mekong Region, BRC Research Report No. 8, 
edited by Masami Ishida (Bangkok Thailand: Bangkok Research Center, IDE-JETRO, 2012), 
http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Brc/08.html. 
68 Wolf, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,” 7. 
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characteristics. Second, a survey is conducted for identifying economic zones, 
economic resources, and actors. Third, the identified economic zones are linked 
with connectivity and infrastructure projects. Fourth, the establishment of special 
economic zones (SEZ) and industrial parks are essential elements of an 
economic corridor, rather than its use as merely a transit corridor for a host 
country. Fifth, the country where the economic corridor is to be located must be 
economically feasible and able to provide a satisfactory financial return. Sixth, 
political will and commitment among all actors are essential for completion and 
implementation. Seventh, feasible rules with centralized control and an in-
bureaucratic approach in execution will mark the success of an economic 
corridor. Eighth, a comprehensive action plan with a proper period and inclusion 
of the private sector is vital for the development of an economic corridor. Ninth, 
geographical stability is of paramount importance to the success of an economic 
corridor. Finally, yet importantly, an economic corridor must be extended to 
regional chains and production networks for the generation of maximum 
economic benefits.69 These aspects are essential for the success of an economic 
corridor. 
2. China’s “One Belt and One Road” Initiative  
China’s “One Belt and One Road” (OBOR) Initiative is Chinese President 
Xi Jinping’s vision, which he first announced in 2013. OBOR is intended to revive 
the connections between Asia, Europe, and Africa by serving as a trade route 
between the three regions. The focus of Chinese diplomacy is OBOR. Embedded 
within OBOR are two main aspects: The Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and 
the 21st Century Maritime Silk Route Economic Belt (CMSR).70 The SREB will 
link China with Europe via railroads, distribution networks, and fiber optics. This 
will allow China to bypass maritime ports if they are blocked during times of war. 
                                            
69 Wolf, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,”9. 
70 Ibid.  
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CPEC is the main portion of OBOR, located at the juncture of the SREB and the 
21st CMSR.71 Details of OBOR are shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. China OBOR with Alignment of CMSR and SREB72 
 
The SREB is a combination of three corridors, namely the Northern, 
Central and Southern Corridors.73 The Northern Corridor will link China to 
Moscow and Germany. The Central Corridor will link China to Europe via Iran’s 
                                            
71 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on April 20, 2015, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1256093.shtml.  
72 Source: “Infographic/China Mapping Silk Road Initiative,” Merics China Mapping 
73 Wolf, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,’’ 8. 
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Bandar Imam Khomeini Port. Finally, the Southern Corridor—the CPEC route—
will originate in Guangzhou, the third largest city of Central China, move toward 
the Xinjiang province in the western part of China via Kashgar, and enter 
Pakistan from Khunjrab Pass in Gilgit–Baltistan province. From Khunjrab Pass, it 
will be linked through different routes inside Pakistan to Gwadar Port, opening to 
the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.74 The SREB’s planned corridors are 
shown in Figure 2.  
Figure 2. Alignment of Northern, Central, and Sothern Corridors 
of Planned SREB75 
 
                                            
74 Rana, Shahbaz “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Lines of development—not lines of 
the divide,” The Express Tribune. May 5, 2015, accessed on June 13, 2017, 
http://tribune.com.pk/story/887949/china-pakistan-economic-corridor-lines-ofdevelopment-not-
lines-of-divide/.  
75 Cui Jia, “China studying new Silk Road rail link to Pakistan,” China Daily, Updated: June 
28, 2014, 07:15, accessed on Oct 18, 2017, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2014-
06/28/content_17621525.htm.   
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3. Overview of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor 
CPEC will provide much in power generation and infrastructural 
development and connect the Chinese province of Xinjiang through a road 
network of 3,000 km (1,800 miles) with Pakistan’s Gwadar Port.76 Under the 
CPEC agreement, China will contribute $46 billion, which is around 20 percent of 
Pakistan’s annual GDP.77 The key aspects of CPEC include Gwadar Port, 
energy, infrastructure, industrialization, and the economic corridor.78 Completion 
of CPEC is projected by 2030 in four phases, as follows: first phase by 2018, 
second phase by 2020, third phase by 2015, and fourth phase by 2030.79 Upon 
completion, approximately 17,000 megawatts of electricity will be generated, 
costing $34 billion, and $12 billion will be spent for infrastructural development.80  
CPEC will shorten the trade route between China and the Middle East by 
12,000 km. It will also link the Middle East with China’s underdeveloped far-
western areas via Gwadar. Moreover, by 2017, a $44 million fiber optic cable will 
provide an additional 10,400 megawatts of electricity, and energy projects worth 
$15.5 billion will also be completed.81 The main focal projects of CPEC will 
include the energy sector, transport infrastructure, optical fiber, pipelines, 
Gwadar Port, and the establishment of special economic zones (SEZs).82  
                                            
76 Saeed Shah, “China’s Xi Jinping Launches Investment Deal in Pakistan,” The Wall Street 
Journal, April 20, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-xi-jinping-set-to-launch-investment-
deal-in-pakistan-1429533767.   
77 Andrew Stevens, “Pakistan Lands $46 Billion Investment from China,” CNN, Money, April 
20, 2015, http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/20/news/economy/pakistan-china-aid-infrastucture/.  
78 Wolf, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,’’ 8. 
79 Andrew Stevens, “Pakistan Lands $46 Billion Investment from China,” CNN, Money, April 
20, 2015, http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/20/news/economy/pakistan-china-aid-infrastucture/. 
80 Saeed Shah, “China’s Xi Jinping Launches Investment Deal in Pakistan,” The Wall Street 
Journal, April 20, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-xi-jinping-set-to-launch-investment-
deal-in-pakistan-1429533767.  
81 M Ilyas Khan, “China’s Xi Jinping Agrees $46bn Superhighway to Pakistan,” BBC News, 
Asia, April 20, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-32377088.  
82 Ali, Akber. “China Pakistan Economic Corridor: Prospects and Challenges for Regional 
Integration.” Arts and Social Sciences Journal 7, no. 204 (2016): 1–5. doi: 10.4172/2151-
6200.1000204. 
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In December 2014, the Chinese Government brought together various 
major banks of China in order to establish the “Silk Road Fund Co., Ltd,” which 
will financially support CPEC. Under the overall supervision of said company, the 
China Development and China Exim banks are responsible for funding CPEC. 
These loans are guaranteed by the Chinese Government and non-payment risks 
are insured by the China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation (Sinosure).83 
China is not the only country that will benefit from CPEC. Pakistan’s 
energy infrastructure is inadequate, so a significant share of CPEC is for the 
energy sector. The total generation of energy would reach 17,000 megawatts of 
electricity, which will double the amount of energy that Pakistan produces now.84 
Energy projects are divided into two categories: priority projects, which are 
planned or are currently in progress, and actively promoted projects, which have 
been proposed but do not have a near or urgent completion time. The share of 
the various priority projects is $21.5 billion of the $34 billion allocated for energy 
(details provided in Appendix A) and will generate 10,400 megawatts of 
electricity. The actively promoted projects will cost $12.9 billion and are expected 
to generate 6,645 megawatts of power. The overview of the proposed projects 
under CPEC is provided in Figure 3. 
                                            
83 Hussain Ahmad Siddiqui, “CPEC Projects: Status, Cost, and Benefits,” Daily Dawn, last 
modified July 13, 2015, http://www.dawn.com/news/1194014.  
84 Markey and West, “Behind China’s Gambit in Pakistan,” 4. 
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Figure 3. Overview of the Proposed Projects under CPEC85  
 
New construction of 1,200 kilometers of tracks and the upgrade of 3,100 
kilometers of roads are also included in the overall plan.
86
 As planned, CPEC will 
be a network of three major routes (Eastern, Central and Western routes) and 
one Northern extension passing through different areas of Pakistan. The Eastern 
Alignment is through Punjab and Sindh, linking the cities of Thakot, Mansehra, 
                                            
85 Jazib Nelson, “The TFT Guide to CPEC for Incredibly Smart People,” Beyond the Horizon, 
(blog). September 10, 2016, accessed on October 20, 2017, http://beyondthehorizon.com.pk/the-
tft-guide-to-cpec-for-incredibly/.  
86 Markey and West, “Behind China’s Gambit in Pakistan,” 4. 
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Islamabad, Lahore, Multan, Hyderabad, Karachi, and Gwadar.
87 The Central 
Route will pass through the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province until it 
connects to Punjab and Sindh. The Western Alignment joins the province of KPK 
with Baluchistan
88
 and connects Dera Ismail Khan, Dera Ghazi Khan, Zhob, 
Quetta and finally Gwadar.
89
 The Northern extension, known as the Northern 
Route, will link the Eastern, Central, and Western Routes with China via 
Khunjrab. Details are attached in Appendix B. 
There are several benefits and concerns about all these routes. The KPK 
and Baluchistan provinces where the Western Route will pass through are under-
developed areas and have security concerns, but this planned alignment does 
provide the shortest distance to Gwadar. Conversely, the Eastern Route passes 
through comparatively developed and peaceful areas, where the upgrading of old 
roads and construction of the Karachi-Peshawar and Sukkur-Multan sections 
have been underway since 2016.
90
 The plan includes more than 40 Special 
Economic Zones (SEZ), which will surely attract and encourage foreign 




Besides roads, railway infrastructure is also given a due share of the 
development. With a cost of $3.6 billion, the railway system is to be 
reconstructed, expanded, and upgraded. The plan includes upgrading the 
provincial Rail-Based Mass Transit Systems and 1,736 kilometers of the main 
                                            
87 Rana, Shahbaz, “Eastern CPEC Route Unfeasible: Report,” The Express Tribune. July 26, 
2015, accessed on June 13, 2017, http://tribune.com.pk/story/926582/economic-corridor-eastern-
cpec-route-unfeasible/.  
88 Ibid. 
89 Zingel, Wolfgang-Peter, China’s Pakistan Option: Economic and Social Implications of an 
‘All-Weather Relationship,’” IIC Quarterly, Indian International Center (IIC): New Delhi, India, 42:2, 
Autumn, 2015, 14–24. 
90 “Peshawar-Karachi Motorway (Multan-Sukkur Section),” CPEC: China Pakistan Economic 
Corridor, accessed on February 2, 2017, http://cpec.gov.pk/project-details/29. 
91 Markey and West, “Behind China’s Gambit in Pakistan,” 5. 
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line between Karachi and Peshawar.
92
 In addition, the envisioned projects 
include the construction of a new 682 kilometers of railway track linking 
Khunjarab, Havelian, Gwadar, and Karachi. Details are attached in Appendix C.
93
 
Gwadar is not only a gateway to CPEC but also a potential cornerstone of 
the strategic triangle of China, Pakistan, and Iran. This port is important for 
energy security and trade. In the future, it will almost certainly be a hub of 
maritime activities, as well as a potential backup option to the Strait of Malacca.
94
 
A fully functional and upgraded Gwadar Port, Economic Processing Zone, 
airport, and hospital, with a total of U.S.$793 million of investment, would mark 
the success of CPEC.
95
 Details are attached in Appendix D. 
The Joint Cooperation Committee, headed by the Minister for Planning 
and Development of Pakistan, was set up by China and Pakistan to monitor the 
ongoing CPEC progress. The committee has five working groups, all of which are 




B. HURDLES FOR THE CPEC 
Ostensibly, the CPEC project seems very simple. Simple things can face 
hurdles as well, however. As legendary German war theorist Clausewitz writes in 
his book On War: “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is 
difficult.”97 CPEC’s successful completion will only occur if the challenges that 
could potentially hinder its progress can be overcome. These challenges will 
                                            
92 Ministry of Planning Development and Reform, Government of Pakistan. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Wolf, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,’’ 14. 
95 Hussain Ahmad Siddiqui, “CPEC Projects: Status, Cost, and Benefits,” Daily Dawn, last 
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96 Ministry of Planning Development and Reform, Government of Pakistan. 
97 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, 
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need to be countered at the geopolitical level and on the regional front. In the 
domestic domain, internal security, transparency, and political consensus need 
special considerations. The following section will discuss the challenges faced in 
the completion of CPEC on Pakistan’s geopolitical, regional and domestic fronts. 
1. Geopolitical Dynamics  
The United States sees CPEC as a multi-lateral project that supports the 
vision of regional economic connectivity and expects Afghanistan’s future 
inclusion in CPEC.98 In the post-NATO withdrawal scenario, the U.S. supports 
China’s positive role in Afghanistan to counter Russian control in the Central 
Asian Republics.99 The U.S. is aware that with the development of Gwadar 
Chinese influence is a potential naval threat in the Indian Ocean.100 As a result, 
the U.S. is developing good strategic relations with India so that India can 
maintain its regional dominance; it supports Indian naval power against future 
Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean and has also signed the civilian Nuclear 
Agreement in 2006.101 
1. Regional Constraints  
Afghanistan’s volatile security situation and the convergent interests of 
Iran and India are regional challenges for the CPEC.102 India is worried by 
China’s growing influence as a regional power and its presence in the Arabian 
Sea.103 Furthermore, the porous border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is a 
                                            
98 Ahmad Rashid Malik, “All-Weather Friendship,” Diplomatic Insight 8, no 5 (2015): 13–15, 
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serious security concern for Pakistan. Tehrik Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Al-Qaeda, 
the Islamic State (ISIS), East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), and other 
groups that operate from Afghanistan have carried out most of the terrorist 
activities in KPK and Baluchistan provinces.104 They could potentially cause a 
considerable delay in the planned timeframe of CPEC.  
As a major regional stakeholder, India is concerned about CPEC’s 
northern route passing through the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir;105 
as it is likely to strengthen Pakistan’s claim to these areas.106 The Indian Foreign 
Minister, Sushma Swaraj, has called CPEC “unacceptable” because it is planned 
through Jammu and Kashmir.107 It was because of this that India boycotted the 
May 14–15, 2017, OBOR forum in Beijing. As Indian External Affairs 
spokesperson Gopal Baglay stated, “No country accepts a project that ignores its 
core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity.”108 The work force on 
different CPEC projects will be from the People’s Liberation Army Corps of 
Engineering. Some scholars consider the CPEC to be part of a Chinese 
colonialist agenda and threat to Indian security.109 These scholars view it as 
China’s strategy to contain India by controlling Gwadar and securing access to 
the Indian Ocean.110  Chinese analyst Zi Shi supports a non-involvement policy in 
the region, one that follows the ‘Three Nos’: namely, no interference in the  
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internal affairs; no increase of influence, and no dominance.111 Notwithstanding 
Indian apprehensions, Pakistani northern areas, where the CPEC Northern 
Route is passing through, have never been under Indian control since 
independence.112 
In addition to their concerns about China using Gwadar as an economic 
hub, India is also concerned that the port may be utilized as a military base. A 
Chinese naval presence in the Arabian Sea is likely to disrupt Indo-U.S. strategic 
cooperation.113  Moreover, India is worried about other seaports being developed 
by China, in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Bangladesh.114 It has a concern that 
through these developments it will be encircled through a “String of Pearls” 
strategy.115 Closer ties between China and Pakistan are considered a challenge 
by Indian thinkers; Gwadar is seen as a project that will affect the region’s 
balance.116  
Unstable and volatile security environments may affect the pace of work 
on CPEC projects. The growing instability in Afghanistan is expected to have the 
spillover effect of instability in Pakistan and western Chinese regions.117 Cordial 
geo-economic relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan would mark the 
success of CPEC, but Pakistan believes that on the behest of India, the Northern 
Alliance is spoiling the trust initiatives agreed to by Pakistan with the Afghan  
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Government.118 Moreover, Pakistan alleges that two foreign agencies are behind 
the terrorist attacks in Baluchistan Province: the Afghanistan National Directorate 
of Security (NDS) and the Indian Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). In October 
2016, the Pakistani government informed the U.S. about the alleged involvement 
of Indian and Afghan intelligence agencies in terrorist attacks inside Pakistan.119 
Uighur militants from the Xinjiang province of China do have links with the 
Taliban and abducted Chinese employed on different projects inside Pakistan.120   
China’s participation in the talks between the Taliban and the Afghan 
government in July 2015, along with the U.S., shows its strong desire for stability 
inside Afghanistan.121 A peaceful Afghanistan is of paramount significance for 
CPEC. China supports the promotion of peace in Afghanistan and has 
highlighted the same in various forums like the, “Fourth Ministerial Conference of 
Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process Held in Beijing,” in October 2014,122 and “Belt and 
Road Forum for International Cooperation” in May 2017, in Beijing, which, as 
noted earlier, India skipped.123 To benefit the most from CPEC, China is fully 
behind easing tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan.  
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The other regional stakeholder in CPEC development, Iran, considers 
Gwadar development as a rival to Chah Bahar.124 Iran understands CBEC’s 
significance and its wide potential of cooperation, however. In May 2016, the 
Iranian ambassador stated that, “We are ready for any rapprochement between 
regional countries which directly impact the interests of the people of our 
countries. Trade and business is business, and politics is politics. We should 
separate them.”125 The Iranian President expressed similar feelings during a 
meeting with the Pakistani prime minister in September 2016 and showed a 
desire to be part of CPEC.126 
2. Domestic Constraints 
The security situation presents one of the leading concerns that may 
hinder the successful completion of CPEC. Extremist elements along the 
Western Route, which passes through the KPK and Baluchistan provinces, may 
target the CPEC projects to harm the Pakistani state.127 The unstable law and 
order situation in Baluchistan province is of great concern, as Gwadar is located 
in Baluchistan.128 Anti-state Baloch insurgents contend that CPEC will exploit 
local resources.129 They have a record of accomplishment of insurgent activities 
against Chinese working on different projects and oppose these national 
development projects, as they perceive that the influx of outsiders might disturb 
the province’s demographic balance.130 These militants are patronized by anti-
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Pakistani, foreign intelligence agencies, RAW, and NDS.131 In April 2015, before 
the Chinese president visited Pakistan, they killed 20 non-local laborers in 
Turbat, Baluchistan.132  
To eliminate the terrorists, the Pakistan Army launched Operation Zarb-e-
Azab in June 2014 in the tribal areas of Waziristan on the border with 
Afghanistan. This operation brought a reasonable decline in the terrorist activities 
in the country as per media reports133 and denied space to the foreign terrorists 
who were launching terrorist activities across Pakistan.134 Besides Operation 
Zarb-e-Azab, the Pakistan Army has also raised two special security divisions 
with 12,000 soldiers each, comprising nine army battalions, and six wings of 
Frontier Corps and Rangers.135 This force will augment the local security 
mechanisms and protect the Chinese workers on different CPEC projects.136 
3. Political Dimensions  
Besides security issues, achieving political consensus among all political 
parties in Pakistan presents as one of the challenges in the completion of CPEC. 
An absence of political consensus on CPEC could delay or disrupt the timeline of 
the project’s completion. This is no passing concern: historically, other projects in 
Pakistan have foundered due to the lack of a shared political and economic 
vision.137 Short-vision political gains negatively affected the national interest, 
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especially in the allocation of resources.138 The KPK and Baluchistan provinces 
have concerns for changing route,139 which the federal government denies.140 In 
response to an objection related to lack of representation in decision making by 
smaller provinces, the government formulated the parliamentary committee in 
September 2015 to supervise CPEC projects. The committee has no say in the 
important decision making of the CPEC Secretariat within the Ministry of 
Planning and Development, however.141 An “All Party Conference” was 
conducted on May 28, 2015, to address the political parties’ concerns about 
CPEC.142 All political parties agreed on the development of the Western Route by 
2018 and pledged their political support.143 
C. CONCLUSION 
CPEC has great potential for ensuring a stable economic future, for all 
regional stakeholders as well as Pakistan and China. Opponents are making an 
all-out effort to throw a wrench into the works by conducting terrorist activities in 
the country. The best minds of forces hostile to CPEC envisage innovative 
methods to derail it, which means that managers of CPEC will have to remove all 
hurdles if they want change their region. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANCE OF CPEC FOR PAKISTAN 
All for ourselves, and nothing for other people, seems, in every age 
of the world, to have been the vile maxim of the masters of 
mankind. 
—Adam Smith144 
CPEC is seen by most as very significant for China and Pakistan. As 
described in the Asian Development Bank study, “economic corridors connect 
economic agents along a defined geography.”145 CPEC potentially provides a 
secure alternate trade route for China, and for Pakistan, it will help its economic 
growth and counter regional Indian influence.146 Aside from the perceived 
economic benefits, CPEC will help secure China’s trade routes and peripheral 
influence and strengthen its presence around the world. Pakistan’s government 
believes CPEC will benefit Pakistan economically by increasing employment, 
alleviating poverty, and bringing stability to previously neglected areas by 
engaging locals in commercial activities. Moreover, government officials expect 
CPEC to attract foreign investment, which should boost Pakistan’s exports, 
increase GDP, and bring improvement in health and essential amenities.147 This 
chapter will analyze the importance of CPEC for Pakistan and China, and it will 
discuss some of the myths and realities regarding CPEC. 
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF CPEC FOR PAKISTAN  
CPEC is not just a transit corridor; rather, it is designed as an economic 
corridor that will bring economic benefits to Pakistan in terms of energy, industry, 
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trade, and new business opportunities.148 Pakistan’s economy has been beaten 
down from energy crisis, inadequate infrastructure, high inflation, and slow 
economic growth. Therefore, Pakistan sees CPEC as vital for the revival of its 
economic growth.149 This section focuses on the importance of CPEC for 
Pakistan in terms of geopolitical concerns, economic growth, foreign direct 
investment, Pakistan’s energy shortage, and infrastructural and social 
development.  
1. CPEC Significance for Pakistan-Geostrategic Level 
CPEC’s great impact is that it would attract regional countries to be part of 
OBOR, thus cementing regional cooperation.150 CPEC potentially may improve 
Pakistan’s geostrategic environment, improve its infrastructure, and give a boost 
to its energy sector. With the huge Chinese investment of U.S.$46 billion, CPEC 
will improve Pakistan’s socio-economic development and bring development to 
its undeveloped areas.
151
 Historically, Pakistan’s location has allowed it to play 
an important role in geopolitics, trade, and transit.152 Pakistan enjoys good 
relations with China and the West and has a good geostrategic location. It could 
potentially help bring normality among these big powers, promote trade 
cooperation, and enhance diplomacy that is oriented toward trade.153 Moreover, 
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the expected inclusion of more regional countries in CPEC will enhance bilateral 
trade.154  
The significance of Gwadar becomes more pronounced in the backdrop of 
the regional power struggle in the Indian Ocean in the 21st century.155 Gwadar 
will be a gateway and pivot port in the region,156 allowing Central Asian countries 
to engage in maritime transport.157 In time, the development of Gwadar would be 
of great economic significance for the under-developed and neglected 
Baluchistan and other regions of Pakistan.158 Gwadar is the strategic pivot of 
CPEC as a whole, as it provides economic security to China and shortens the 
maritime distance from Shanghai to North America by 9,000 kms. CPEC would 
bypass the future contested territory of the Strait of Malacca and the Indian 
Ocean for China.159 
2. Perceived Economic Growth 
Pakistan’s economic growth has been gradually improving over the past 
three years. It has been linked with the rise in investment, besides private and 
public consumption, which, in turn, reflects on CPEC projects and public 
investment.160 A World Bank study predicts gradual economic growth in 
Pakistan’s economy by more than 5 percent in FY2017 with a further increase of 
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5.4 percent in FY2018. The predicted increase in Pakistan’s GDP, largely as a 
result of CPEC, is shown in Figure 1. 
The domestic construction industry, the electricity generation projects, and 
the infrastructure projects will all grow with the progress of CPEC projects. The 
industry and service sectors will grow with the availability of electricity.161 The 
proposed 29 industrial parks, which include 21 mineral zones and 27 SEZs, 
would play a vital role in the industry and trade sectors. Above all, the planned 9 
km2 Gwadar SEZ would play an important role in profiting the livestock, energy, 
agriculture, and minerals industries.162 The predicted gradual increase in 
Pakistan’s GDP growth is shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4. Pakistan GDP Growth163  
 
 
3. Foreign Direct Investment 
Besides infrastructure development and overcoming energy crisis, the 
CPEC projects’ value would exceed all foreign direct investment (FDI) since 
1970, which is approximately equivalent to 17 percent of Pakistan’s GDP. 
Moreover, the project will boost Pakistan’s economic growth rate by 2.5 percent 
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and create some 700,000 jobs.164 As the CPEC projects move ahead, there will 
be more FDI flows from China to Pakistan. FDI will bear fruit in the medium term. 
The progress on CPEC projects and consistency in energy supply will maintain 
an upward increase in industrial growth, with the FDI, official reserves reaching 
from U.S.$13.5 billion to U.S.$18.2 billion in June 2016, as compared to June 
2015.165 The boost in FDI with the commencement of CPEC in 2015, where FDI 
goes up from $1.88 billion in 2013 to $46 billion in 2015, is shown in Figure 5. 
Figure 5. FDI Flow to Pakistan166 
 
 
Attracting FDI and development will depend solely on the Pakistani 
government’s policies and working environment. In the present political and 
security situation, development work will be hard to undertake; financial 
liberalization and governmental policies would augment the development 
process, however. Chinese investment in the present environment would make 
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the development process possible.167 Legal and institutional setups, under the 
government control of Pakistan, would mark the success of the development.168 
The decline in return rates in industrialized countries and availability of surplus 
saving and investable funds in the global market has made China’s investment 
possible in Pakistan. The comparative advantage of investing in Pakistan is due 
to expected higher returns, coupled with government policies, cheap indigenous 
labor, and availability of raw material.169 
4. Overcoming Energy Shortages 
Over the years, Pakistan has faced an energy shortage; this is mostly due 
to a lack of efficiency coupled with political instability and the Pakistani people’s 
increased demand for energy.170 The previously mentioned World Bank study 
has termed the non-availability of electricity as the main hurdle to economic 
growth and FDI.171 To honor the official designation of CPEC as an economic 
corridor, the major share of all Chinese investment is planned to go to energy 
projects on a build-to-own-operate model.172 These projects would address the 
energy shortcomings of the country. Special financial protection is being 
extended to all Chinese investors undertaking energy projects in Pakistan.173 
Chinese investment in Pakistan aims at accelerating the country’s growth in 
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various sectors like mining, food, energy, and construction. Moody’s Investors 
Service also describes CPEC as “credit positive.”174 
The major share of investment of over $33 billion would shed the long 
energy crisis with an added amounts of energy.175 By the end of March 2018, 
when 14 out of the 21 gas, coal and solar energy projects are completed, an 
additional 10,400 MW of energy will be available. This figure will rise to 16,400 
MW when all of CPEC’s energy projects are operational.176 
The Country’s socio-economic development is directly linked to the 
availability of energy.177 CPEC’s major investment in the energy sector may 
provide a way out of Pakistan’s energy crisis.178 Moreover, whether these 
projects are cost-effective and help to lift the people out of poverty will largely 
depend on the accurate location of power and industrial projects.179 CPEC’s 
progression will mark the journey towards stability. With energy issues resolved, 
Pakistan in the future will be an axis of regional trade and an economic hub, will 
provide jobs to the locals, and will give a developed infrastructure to the 
country.180  
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5. Infrastructure Development 
Another area where Pakistan will benefit from CPEC will be its 
infrastructure, which can be defined as “the system of public works of a 
country, state, or region; also: the resources (such as personnel, 
buildings, or equipment) required for an activity.”
181
 The World Bank study 
concluded that per capita income at purchasing power parity is directly linked 
with infrastructure development. Infrastructural development does have a bearing 
on per capita income.
182
 Regional infrastructure also uplifts standards of living, 
alleviates poverty, connects isolated places with financial hubs, and thus narrows 
a country’s development gaps.
183
 Pakistan’s bleak picture of infrastructure 
conditions in the world ranking is shown in Table 1. 
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(out of 139) 
Quality of overall infrastructure 100 
Quality of roads 72 
Quality of railroad infrastructure 55 
Quality of port infrastructure 73 
Quality of air transport infrastructure 81 
Available airline seat kilometers 48 
Quality of electricity supply 128 
Fixed telephone lines 115 
Mobile telephone subscriptions 107 
 
Pakistan presently has a deteriorated infrastructure, which includes power 
shortages, deteriorated roads, and railways, and decreased shipping and 
national carriers.185 Pakistan needs infrastructural development in order for there 
to be an acceleration in economic growth. Over the last two decades, Pakistan’s 
infrastructural development has deteriorated, and it needs financial solutions for 
infrastructural construction and development. The lack of sufficient funds in the 
past has mainly caused inadequate infrastructural development.186 Without the 
development of infrastructure, Pakistan cannot enhance its volume of exports. 
Moreover, the foreign investment in the manufacturing sector is also directly 
proportional to the supporting facilities in the country.187 The Planning 
Commission of Pakistan has estimated a loss of 4 percent to 5 percent of GDP 
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due to poor performance in the transport sector. To address these issues, 
infrastructure’s share in CPEC’s funding is around 36 percent, with the aim of 
development through connectivity.188 
CPEC’s successful completion would reduce the trade route from China to 
the Gulf of Oman from 12,000 km via sea to 2,200 km via Pakistan. Infrastructure 
gets the major share after energy spending, with $11 billion out of the total $46 
billion spent on infrastructural developments. These planned infrastructural 
developments will link and uplift the under-developed areas of Pakistan, attract 
investment and give a boost to the economy.189 Upgrading the Karakoram 
Highway and construction of a Karachi-to-Lahore motorway are currently 
underway as part of infrastructure projects.190 
Gwadar’s strategic location makes it significant for the economic growth of 
Pakistan. Its unique position at the end of the Gulf of Oman makes it a gateway 
out of The Gulf, for oil trade towards Japan and Western countries. Gwadar’s 
development as a free port would revolutionize the economic growth of Pakistan 
with its linkage to international trade.191   
6. Impact of CPEC on Social Welfare 
Through energy and infrastructure developments, CPEC surely will uplift 
Pakistan’s social welfare. In light of the UNDP Report of 2016, Pakistan’s 
standing in the human development index (HDI) value is 0.550, and its standing 
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is 147th out of 188 countries.192 The comparison of Pakistan, Bangladesh, and 
India, where Pakistan’s HDI is the lowest among these countries, is shown in 
Figure 6. CPEC promises to raise Pakistan’s HDI, especially in the 
underdeveloped areas of KPK and Baluchistan.  




Infrastructure development and economic growth will positively affect 
socioeconomic growth and improve the life of the common man and women 
woman. Mehar has analyzed the socioeconomic development through a model 
shown in Table 2, where resolving energy shortage, regional connectivity, and 
infrastructural development are shown as the main pillars for the subsequent 
success of CPEC.  
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7. CPEC and Tourism  
Pakistan’s Northern areas and other historical sites and cities have a great 
potential for the revival of Pakistan’s tourism industry. CPEC will potentially lift 
the Pakistani tourism industry, which peaked in the 1970s. Many attractive tourist 
sites are spread along the CPEC route, with very promising potential. Gilgit-
Baltistan attracts many mountaineers, as the world-renowned peaks of K2 and 
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Major Sectors: construction, cement, energy, real estate, logistic services, 
transportation, banking and finance, auto and allied services, technical and vocational
education, health and pharmaceutical, chemical, security services, airline 
industry, shipping industry, telecommunication, engineering 
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the Nanga Parbat top the list of scalable mountains in this area. Tourism, 
however, is deeply linked with peace and better infrastructure.
195
 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF CPEC FOR CHINA  
China will accrue great strategic and economic benefits out of CPEC. 
Besides the perceived transformation of economic development in Xinjiang 
province, China hopes to counter separatist sentiments through prosperity in 
these areas.
196
 China’s perceived benefits are in not only the economic sphere 
but also in the regional and strategic areas, too. Should CPEC not materialize as 
planned, Chinese interest may divert to alternate options.
197
 
Chinese crude oil dependency from the Gulf and Iran is around 47 percent 
of its total consumption; with the development of CPEC, Gwadar will provide a 
shorter, safer and economical route to western China.
198
 The overall inland 
distance from eastern China to Western China would decrease from 16,000 km 
to 3000 km.
199
 According to Akber Ali, China is concerned that its security and oil 
trade is vulnerable, as 80 percent of its oil imports pass through the Malacca 
Strait.
200
 China thinks that its main opposition comes from the regional and global 
powers in the South and East China Seas. CPEC addresses all these issues of 
Chinese concern of trade security and links China with the Indian Ocean through 
the deep-sea port of Gwadar. The Trans-Pacific Treaty among allies and the U.S. 
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speaks to the importance of rebalancing to Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. This 
treaty causes concern to Chinese regional economic interests, as it focuses on 
the countries of Southeast Asia’s military, economic and strategic rebalance.
201
 
C. CPEC—MYTHS AND REALITIES  
Besides the vast acceptance and importance of CPEC, there are a few 
questions and controversies raised by the media and several scholars against 
CPEC.
202
 This study has no access to the detailed official agreement between 
Pakistan and China for analysis and clarification of the ambiguities they raise. 
Remarkably, a few scholars have compared CPEC to the East India Company 
(EIC), whereas a few have argued that it will turn Pakistan into a Chinese colony 
or province. This section analyzes the arguments of different scholars on various 
aspects of CPEC and the Government of Pakistan’s response to them.  
Ayub Mehar has summarized these arguments in terms of six points. The 
first is that CPEC would change the strategic interests of the U.S. and all regional 
powers in the international power game. A second is that few politicians in 
Pakistan have raised the controversy of Western versus Eastern routes for the 
country’s development. A third is the concern of some that Baluchistan will 
become a minority because of new settlements and being deprived of their due 
share. A fourth is the concern of Pakistan’s business community about the inflow 
of Chinese investment and business enterprises and the influx of Chinese labor 
to Pakistan. A fifth is the overestimation, unwise negotiation, and questionable 
financial feasibility of CPEC versus repayment of the higher cost of financing. 
The final point concerns the corruption, bad practices, and opaque mechanisms 
followed when contracting with Chinese firms and the inability of the Pakistani 
manufacturing industry’s to compete with its Chinese counterpart. Nevertheless, 
as Mario Esteban argues, connectivity would foster traditional Pakistani exports, 
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mainly textile and sporting-goods.
203
 He believes that local economic sectors and 
various-sized enterprises are the neglected domains in the overall planning of 




Many scholars argue that the high interest rates on CPEC’s loans mean 
that Pakistan will have to pay around $90 billion back to China over 30 years.
205
 
Transparency and the utilization of funds are also the primary concerns among 
scholars, in addition to resource mobilization and other financial government 
policies. More dependency on foreign aid for infrastructure development is a 
broken record in Pakistani history. Foreign borrowing has increased the burdens 
on its weak economy and will have lasting effects on it. The exports of Pakistan 
are linked with the infrastructure development, and foreign investment in the 
manufacturing sector is intensely dependent on the available supporting facilities 
in the country.
206
 The CPEC interest rates are reasonable, however. The rate for 
the $11 billion share for infrastructure development is at the concessionary rate 
of 1.6 percent, as compared to the past infrastructural projects financed by the 
World Bank at between 5 to 8.5 percent interest.
207
 The repayment schedule of 
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Along with other scholars, lawmaker Senator Tahir Mashhadi, chairman of 
the Senate Standing Committee on Planning and Development, termed CPEC 
another East India Company (EIC). He welcomed the project but showed his 
concerns if it did not address the country’s interests.
209
 Others disagree and 
argue that comparing CPEC with EIC is specious. CPEC, unlike EIC, has no 
element of force and no future intentions of acquiring the governance 
responsibilities of administration, justice, and armed forces control.
210
 Saad 
Ahmad Dogar has identified four ways in which CPEC differs from EIC.
211
 First, 
China has been a victim of imperialist aggression and unlike EIC, has no 
intention of economic exploitation and accumulation of wealth. Second, the 
Chinese methodology of expanding its economic influence around the world is 
not through military force, but it is entirely through economic prosperity as it has 
done in Africa. Third, EIC eyed the rich sub-continent, whose income was 27 
percent of the world’s total back in 1700 AD, whereas CPEC focuses mainly on 
energy and infrastructural development. Fourth, unlike the colonial period, 
Pakistan has formal institutions like courts and other authorities for 
implementation of checks and balances with a degree of fairness.212 Efforts to 
colonize Pakistan, if any, and irregularities can always be checked by the 
Pakistani free judiciary, which recently has removed a sitting elected prime 
minister on charges of corruption. 
To be sure, Pakistan should not take CPEC as a God-given gift, or a self-
paying enterprise, that addresses all of Pakistan problems. Instead, it should be 
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seen as an opportunity for economic growth.
213
 To this end, the IMF has also 
warned that CPEC could be a risk in the future and financing needs would raise 
$15.1 billion from the current $11.4 billion in the years 2018–2019.
214
 Excessive 
debts could put Pakistan in a Greece-like situation and compel it to go back to 
the IMF in the future.
215
 Pakistan’s debt is gradually increasing, and by the year 
2019–20, it may rise from its current $73 billion to $110 billion.
216 
Pakistan will have to pay a huge environmental cost. Pakistan’s 
contribution to funds, the value of land, environmental effects, and social costs 
are unaccounted aspects that are missing from government planning.
217
 Pakistan 
must pay a huge environmental price with the cutting of plenty of trees and air 
pollution with the planned daily movement of around 7,000 containers.
218
  
Others have compared CPEC to the Marshall Plan (1948 to 1951). The 
Marshall Plan, however, was meant for capacity-building, not just infrastructure 
development, whereas CPEC aims more at infrastructure development.   
Some in the media have also sensationalized CPEC. For example, Dawn 
News made headlines in the Pakistani media for alleged leakage of the detailed 
CPEC Long Term Plan (LTP). Its report argued that CPEC, contrary to the 
Pakistani government’s claims of infrastructural and energy development, aims at 
fostering Chinese enterprise and its main interest is in agriculture, large cities, 
surveillance systems, and visa-free entry.
219
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In response to points raised in the media leak, Dr. Kamal argued that the 
concerns of skeptics were too broad but did highlight the textile industry downfall 
and future inadequacies. Dr. Kamal also elaborated the importance of CPEC and 
its possible benefits for Pakistan.
220
 Minister Iqbal also termed the leak report as 
an old draft and negated the points raised on the LTP, and emphasized that 




CPEC, in the present economic and security environments, appears to be 
an excellent opportunity for addressing Pakistan’s energy crisis and infrastructure 
needs. All CPEC promises of prosperity are linked with the timely planned 
completion of all projects. Myths and realities related to the different aspects of 
transparency and loan borrowing cannot be answered at this initial stage, 
however. Subsequent progress and the unveiling of agreements between China 
and Pakistan would explain all the queries. The development would attract FDI 
and bring socioeconomic prosperity to the country. CPEC would also foster 
regional stability and bring improvement in Pakistan’s relations with neighbors 
through the inclusion of regional stakeholders’ part of the project. Security, 
stability, transparency, and continuity would lead to timely completion and 
mitigate the hurdles posed by domestic, regional, and international actors. The 
Chinese policy of openness and OBOR would lead them to be the future center 
of Central Asia.222 The next chapter compares CPEC with the Panama and Suez 
Canals.   
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IV. COMPARISON OF CPEC WITH OTHER MAJOR 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS: THE CASE OF THE PANAMA 
AND SUEZ CANALS 
Liberation of the peoples through the development of credit and 
labor, creation of railroads, the binding together of worlds and 




In a classic sense, there are no projects comparable to CPEC. Projects 
like the Panama and Suez Canals, however, share certain similarities with CPEC 
that allow them to be used to illustrate some of the effects that CPEC is 
anticipated to have on the Pakistani economy. For example, the Suez Canal, 
Panama Canal, and CPEC were conceptualized and envisioned by foreign 
powers, rather than the locals of the area where the projects were executed. Until 
nationalization, both the Suez and Panama Canals did not bring considerable 
economic benefits to the host nations, as foreign powers did not pay much in 
revenues to them. On other hand, these canals brought strategic laurels to big 
powers too, both economically and militarily. This section covers the analysis of 
the Panama and Suez Canals and comparison with CPEC. 
A. PANAMA CANAL 
1. Rationale for the Canal 
The Panama Canal connects the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans through the 
Isthmus of Panama. In the 1880s, the French could not complete the 
construction of the Panama Canal due to tropical diseases; later, the United 
States completed it between 1904 and 1914. The land that is currently the 
country of Panama was a province of Colombia until the U.S. supported the 
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Panama Revolution of 1903 in order to take control of the canal project. This 
canal connects 144 trade routes, with 160 states and 1,700 ports worldwide.
224
 
To stabilize the political situation in Panama, two treaties were signed between 
President Jimmy Carter of the U.S. and Maximum Leader of the Panamanian 
Revolution Omar Efraín Torrijos Herrera of Panama on September 7, 1977. Both 
treaties went into effect on October 1, 1979. One treaty was related to the 
transitional co-management of the Canal until the year 2000, when the canal had 
to be entirely under the control of Panama, and the other treaty was related to 
the neutrality of the canal after December 31, 1999.225 Among the top users of 
the Panama Canal are the U.S. and China.226 The Panama Canal saves 8,000 
nautical miles of distance and 30 days of journey between the Atlantic and 




In 2007, work began on a new set of locks capable of handling ships too 
large to fit through the original locks. The expansion, which was completed in 
2016, cost $5.3 billion, or 10–15 percent of Panama’s 2016 GDP. This expansion 
could potentially further develop Panama’s ports and its logistics industry. 228  
More than three quarters of Panama’s dollar-based economy derives from 
the service sector.
229
 According to Thomas Sigler, Panama’s current economy 
rests on six main pillars that together form what he calls the canal agglomeration. 
These components are international banking, neoliberal governance, the Colon 
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Free Zone, flags of convenience, a dollarized economy, and auxiliary services.
230 
He explains how the service-based economy centers on the Canal through a 
model made by economist and former president of Panama Nicolás Ardito 
Barletta, shown in Figure 7. 
Figure 7. Panama’s Canal Agglomeration Economy231  
 
2. Immediate Impact on Government Revenues 
The Panama Canal’s revenue impact on Panama’s economy can be 
divided into three segments: 1903–1977, from the time when the Canal Zone 
was originally handed over to the U.S. to when the Carter-Torrijos treaties were 
signed; 1977–1999, the transition period when control of the Canal was returned 
to Panama; and the time since that transition ended in 1999, with Panama now 
controlling the Canal and completing its expansion. 
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Economic benefits from 1903–1979: Prior to October 1, 1979, the tolls 
collected from the Panama Canal’s operation did not benefit much Panama’s 
economy.
232
 This was because before the Carter-Torrijos treaties, the original 
1903 treaty fixed the canal revenues from the U.S. to Panama as an annual 
payment. The payment began as $250,000 annually, was raised to $430,000 in 
1936, $1.93 million in 1955, and $2.5 million from 1975 and 1979.
233
 In addition 
to these rental payments, the Canal Company contributed to Panama’s economy 
in other ways, such as the employment of Panamanians on the Canal and the 
purchases of goods, services, and refined oil from international companies in 
Panama.
234
 Table 3 presents direct canal revenues. 
Table 3.   Direct Revenues from the Canal (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
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Economic benefits from 1979–1999: In 1977, in the light of the Carter-
Torrijos treaties, Panama gained immediate control of railroad, ports, and other 
activities and 2,700 U.S. citizens lost job protection.235 The treaties increased the 
annuity from $2.3 million to $10 million, with an additional $10 million paid for 
public services; Panama received revenues of $0.30 per ton on the cargo that 
transited the canal. In addition, the U.S. pledged $295 million in economic aid to 
Panama, which would be paid out over five years. In addition to these direct 
payments, the Panama Canal indirectly benefited the Panamanian economy. It is 
estimated that in 1988, $142 million were paid in wages and salaries to 
Panamanian workers, $52 million in retirement and disability benefits and $38 
million for services and local purchase of goods.236  
Economic benefits from 1999–2016: Since 1997, GDP in Panama has 
experienced unprecedented levels of growth.237 The Panama Canal and the 
services related to it have always been the most important sector of Panama’s 
economy, particularly after the Canal was fully handed over to Panama in 1999. 
Though the American presence did add positively to the Panama economy 
before said period, the canal tolls did not. The years following the Canal transfer 
saw a precipitous rise in global maritime trade, particularly a surge in container 
traffic, which played a paramount role in the rise of toll revenue from the Canal. 
With this increase, the Canal’s overall revenue is increasing nearly $2 billion 
annually and is expected to rise to $6 billion annually by 2025.238 Figure 8 shows 
the increase in the GDP per capita of Panama.  
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Figure 8. Panama GDP Per Capita  
 
Despite this boost in its economic growth, according to the CIA Factbook, 
“Panama has the second worst income distribution in Latin America.”
239
 Even 
though a 10 percent reduction in the poverty rate was observed between 2006 
and 2012, around one quarter of Panama’s population still lives in poverty. The 




3. Stimulation of Private Investment 
An IMF study of 2017 shows that the recent exceptional growth in 
Panama’s economy is mainly due to large investment projects with $5.3 billion 
invested over 2007–16. These completed projects include the Canal expansion, 
Metro Line I (train service between Los Andes County and the city center), some  
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highway sections, and the revamping of Panama City’s old town.241 Moreover, 
between the years 2008 and 2016, on average, these projects have contributed 
to a 4 percent increase in Panama’s annual economic growth.242 The gradual 
increase in the private investment from 1977 onwards is shown in Table 4.  
Table 4.   Private and Public Investment 1972–1979 
 
 
The current and planned investment projects with an estimated total value 
of $16.7 billion, or about 30.3% of Panama’s 2016 GDP, are shown in Table 5.243   
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Table 5.   Overview of Ongoing and Planned Investment Projects244   
 
 
4. Activities that Developed in Panama that Would Not Have 
Occurred without the Canal 
Panama’s per capita income has doubled since 2004. Overall, in the Latin 
American Countries (LAC) over the last two decades, Panama has had the 
highest growth. This has contributed to an improvement in the socio-economic 
conditions, with a reduction in poverty and income inequality.245 In the regional 
domain, Panama’s infrastructure quality is high and attracts investment. The 
Panama Canal and the upcoming expansion of Tocumen Airport have played 
and will play important roles in making Panama a regional hub. Panama has the 
best road infrastructure in the region. With the Panama Canal, related port and 
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logistic activities significantly contributed to the economic growth of Panama.246 
Panama is a net exporter of electricity to Costa Rica. Though internet usage in 
Panama is low, it is the interconnection point of the international fiber submarine 
cable.247 
In 2017, an IMF study compared Panama’s characteristics with Singapore, 
and found that both had these same advantages: an ideal geographical location, 
stability in the political and economic domains, port and airport connectivity, and 
above all, an openness to world trade. With these advantages, Panama can 
potentially transform from a regional logistics hub into a global one.248 
Along with this other economic growth, Panama is attracting more tourists 
annually. The tourism industry is mainly driven by Panama being an affordable 
tourist destination for a broad range of eco-tourism and beaches. Panama City 
has become a tourism hub and a shopping destination, and the upcoming new 
convention center and the expanded Tocumen Airport are expected to attract 
more high-end activities to Panama City. Panama’s tourism industry will improve 
if it is spread out around the country. This will spread the economic growth 
around the country rather than concentrate it in Panama City.249   
B. SUEZ CANAL 
1. The Rationale for the Canal  
The Suez Canal is another example of how foreign-funded economic 
corridors can radically change a country’s economic and political landscape. 
According to Barbra Harlow and Mia Carter, a French diplomat, Ferdinand de 
Lesseps, first envisioned the Suez Canal. He marketed his idea of the Canal as 
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an economic channel for conveyance and transportation of goods.250 Much larger 
than the Panama Canal in scale, it had the same underlying reasons for 
construction: to reduce the time taken for ships to travel between Europe/the 
Mediterranean and Asia/the Indian Ocean. 
The Suez Canal Company, a private entity with a majority of French 
investors, constructed the Canal. The Suez Canal formally opened on November 
17, 1869. Steamship requirements enhanced subsequently with opening of the 
Canal, as sailing vessels had navigation difficulty moving through the 
waterway.251 
Britain used the Suez Canal extensively for shipping, transporting 60% to 
80% of its tonnage along that path.252 Britain increased its military presence in 
the area and attacked Egypt (then part of the Ottoman Empire) to take control of 
the Suez Canal in 1882.253 Later, in 1888, Europeans negotiated the 
Constantinople Convention, which declared the Canal “shall always be free and 
open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, 
without distinction of flag.”254 Egypt was made a British colony on December 18, 
1914, and Britain assumed all powers of the 1888 Constantinople Convention.255  
In 1952, when President Gamal Abdel Nasser assumed power in Egypt as 
a champion of Egyptian nationalism, the British agreed to withdraw their troops 
from Egypt within 20 months.256 On July 26, 1956, Nasser announced that Egypt 
was nationalizing the Canal and would block Israeli ships from using it. As a 
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result, Israel, France, and Britain invaded Egypt on October 29, 1956.257 With 
U.S. pressure, invading forces withdrew and the Suez Canal was opened in April 
1957. The Suez Canal was later closed twice, in 1967 and 1973, both times due 
to war between Egypt and Israel. It has remained open, however, since the 
signing of the 1979 Camp David Accords.
258
   
The presence of the Canal made the territory a hotbed of colonial intrigue. 
Unlike the Panama Canal, where the presence of a neighboring military power 
(the United States) discouraged other powers from interfering, the Suez Canal’s 
location and its effect on international trade to all major British colonies “including 
India” made sure that the French and the British were in a constant tug of war for 
influence in the region. There would have been colonial intrigue between France 
and Britain. Then, Nasser nationalized the Canal and blockaded Israel, leading to 
the Suez Crisis. The U.S. intervened, and peace was restored. There were two 
other times the Canal was shut down.  
Its unique geographic location does put the Suez Canal in a significant 
position, as it provides the shortest link between Asia and Europe.259 The 
Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea are joined by this canal, which makes it 
important for both Egypt and the world. Maritime transport is cheaper than 
shipping by land or by air. Since about 80 percent of the world’s trade is shipped 
by sea, whenever maritime traffic increases, the importance of the Suez Canal 
also increases. It also provides the shortest route between the regional ports as 
compared to travel around the Cape of Good Hope; at a speed of 15 knots, this 
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can save up to nine days and reduce the distance by more than 3,000 nautical 
miles.260 This saves fuel, time, and cost, as shown in Table 6: 261 
Table 6.   Suez Canal Distance Saving Chart
262
 




SC Cape Miles % 
Ras Tanura 
Constanza 4,144 12,094 7,950 66 
Lavera 4,684 10,783 6,099 57 
Rotterdam 6,436 11,169 4,733 42 
New York 8,281 11,794 3,513 30 
Jeddah  
Piraeus 1,316 11,207 9,891 88 
Rotterdam 3,997 10,797 6,800 63 
Tokyo Rotterdam 11,192 14,507 3,315 23 
Singapore Rotterdam 8,288 11,755 3,647 29 
 
2. Immediate Impact on Government Revenues 
The Canal had a significant effect on Egypt’s economy. By 1955, revenue 
from the Canal provided up to 1.6 percent of Egypt’s GDP, making it one of the 
biggest contributors to the Egyptian economy; this was a significant rise from its 
contribution a decade earlier, when it contributed less than half a percent of 
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Egypt’s GDP.263 By 2017, it was contributing around 3% of GDP,264 and its 
contribution is expected to increase significantly with more investment and the 
new Suez Canal. The gradual increase in revenue has made the Canal one of 
Egypt’s major sources of hard currency, in addition to remittances from tourism 
and people working abroad.
265
 Table 7 shows the upward trend in the revenues 
collected from the Suez Canal. 
Table 7.   Revenues Collected from Suez Canal 
 
 
The Canal is an important player in world trade and the Egyptian 
economy. In 2016, 5.5 million barrels of oil, roughly 5.6 percent of the world’s oil 
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supply, passed through the Suez Canal.266 It is an important hub for trade to and 
from the Persian Gulf and Asia. Besides the income generated from transit fees, 
the Suez Canal also furnishes livelihoods to thousands of Egyptians. Numerous 
industries have grown up in Port Suez and Port Said and along the western flank 
of the Canal.267 
3. Stimulation of Private Investment 
Egypt’s economy has suffered budget deficits since the Nasser era, and it 
reached an alarming level of 11.5 percent in fiscal year 2015–2016. Moreover, no 
public-private partnership existed before 2006. Since 2010, political instability 
has negatively affected the Egyptian economy. Government economic reforms in 
the private sector, however, offer hope for better economic growth in the 
future.268   
The expansion of the Suez Canal carried out by the armed forces (and 
completed in one year) aimed at new jobs creation, an increase in growth rates, 
and attracting new investments. Some scholars argue this will negatively impact 
the private sector in the long term, however. Furthermore, private companies find 
it hard to compete with the military because of the armed forces’ increased 
influence and authority in the business sector in getting the contracts.269  
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4. The Suez Canal, its Expansion and Significant Role in Egypt’s 
Economy  
The Suez Canal revenues are of great importance for Egypt’s economy.
270
 
The Suez Canal has contributed to the overall development of Egypt. Over the 
past ten years, Egypt has risen more than 30 places on the World Bank’s Logistic 
Performance Index.
271
 The Canal on the international level has also served 
Europeans in their trade with Asia. To meet the international shipping 
requirements, the Canal has been deepened and widened from time to time.
272
 
The tolls collected from Suez have remained stable, but the ups and down in toll 
collection are directly linked with the international market conditions. For 
example, in 1998–1999, a drop in oil exports affected toll collection; it recovered 
in 2000–2001, when the revenue was $355 million.
273
 
The work on the 72 km New Suez Canal started in July 2014 and was 
completed in July 2015 with $8.2 billion of domestic investment. This project also 
included the Great Bitter Lakes and Ballah bypasses, deepening and widening 
for two-way ship traffic and accommodating bigger ships. This new project aimed 
to make Egypt a center of world trade and give confidence to the domestic 
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The New Suez Canal project will potentially transform Egypt into a world 
industrial and logistic center. The country’s geographic location can make it a 
world-class industrial economic zone and leader in logistic services for maritime 
trade passing through the Suez Canal.
275
 Some scholars believe that the New 
Canal, besides being a huge infrastructure project, will become the main 
economic and logistics interest of Egypt. The New Suez Canal will further  
increase the importance of maritime trade through the Mediterranean, which 
presently is 19% of world traffic and has increased by 120% in the last 15 
years.
276
    
Suez Canal revenues make up 5 percent of Egypt’s gross national product 
(GNP) and 10 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), with annual transit 
fees of over $5 billion. The New Canal will increase the revenue by $13.2 billion 
by 2023.
277
 It is hoped that the new project will transform the Sinai and the areas 
around the Canal, which have unexploited economic resources but have 
remained neglected in the past. 278 
The New Canal has lessened the transit time of ships considerably, from 
19 to 11 hours. It is expected that the number of ships passing through the Canal 
daily will rise from its level of 49 to 97 by 2023. This will have a considerable 
positive influence on the world trade movement and revenue collection.
279
 More 
new job opportunities are expected with the New Suez Canal, especially for the 
youth in technical and services fields.
280
 The Canal expansion is projected to 
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create approximately one million new jobs, benefiting five million families.
281
 The 
establishment of logistic centers alongside the Canal will attract foreign direct 
investment, giving growth to transportation and logistics.
282
 
The New Suez Canal has economic relevance for the Egyptian economy, 
as an efficient revenue provider, with more than $5.4 billion a year in toll  
collection fees, enhancing a transportation system that is essential for world 
trade.
283 The New Suez Canal is expected to gradually improve the value of the 
Egyptian pound.284 Through cultivation and reclamation of approximately 4 
million acres of land, the New Suez Canal will give food security to the Egyptian 
people. Moreover, fish farming in a planned 23 sediment basins will also 
enhance annual returns and generate more jobs.
285
 
The foreign currency sources from tourism and crude oil exports through 
the Suez Canal constituted 4.4 percent of GDP in the early 2000s. Tourism is 
labor intense and more than 2.2 million Egyptians earn their livelihood from 
tourism. It is considered the engine of Egypt’s economic development.286 
Security issues have affected tourism in Egypt, but hopes are high for its 
restoration.   
Scholars have expressed skepticism regarding the claims that the 
increased revenues from the Suez Canal will help to revive Egypt’s economy, 
which has been badly affected by the slump in tourism. Criticism has also been 
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voiced on development of new industrial zones, which will require upgrades in 
the infrastructure and the need to protect the land from seawater intrusion.287 
The downside of Egypt’s economy shows a different picture. A fast-
growing population with limited natural resources is a challenge for Egypt, where 
over half of Egyptians live below the poverty line.288 Poverty in Egypt has its 
negative effect among children too; one fifth of Egyptian children have never 
attended school, and the most frequent reason for school dropouts is poverty of 
the parents.289 
Business reforms from 2004 to 2008 did attract foreign investment and 
increased growth; according to the CIA’s World Factbook, however, business 
reforms from 2004, joblessness and poor living conditions proved to be leading 
factors in the 2011 Revolution that ousted Hosni Mubarak. Since then, 
uncertainty about the security and political situations has slowed the rate of 
economic growth, affected tourism, and pushed up unemployment, which 
remains higher than 10 percent.290 
C. COMPARISON OF CPEC TO THE PANAMA AND SUEZ CANALS, AND 
ASSESSMENT LESSONS 
Economic strength is another name for military strength. Many military 
analysts believe that the Allies won World War II because they were 
economically more powerful than the Germans.291 Considering economic power 
as the linchpin of military might, countries try to cripple the economic strength of 
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their enemy.292 The Suez and Panama Canals did not face such challenges, as 
they were backed by powerful nations when they were built. CPEC likely will 
provide Pakistan with increased economic strength. For this reason, nations 
hostile to Pakistan, both regional and extra-regional, have begun covert 
operations to hamper the project’s successful execution. An insurgency is being 
supported inside Baluchistan,
293
 and a rival port is being developed at Chah  
Bahar, Iran, which is approximately 100 km away from Gwadar Port.294 
CPEC, just like the Panama and Suez Canals, will facilitate global 
maritime trade and will bring prosperity to the region.
295
 The Suez Canal reduces 
the maritime distance between the Straits of Gibraltar and Muscat from 9,800 
nautical miles (nM), to 4,300 nM if moving around the Cape of Good Hope (South 
Africa). The Panama Canal also saves 8,000 nM of distance between the Atlantic 
and Pacific Oceans compared to the distance around Cape Horn. 
Correspondingly, CPEC also saves 10,000 miles of transit distance between 
Western China and Eastern Europe, and potentially could make Pakistan an 
economic hub of connectivity, like the Panama and Suez Canals.
296
 Moreover, 
the Panama and Suez Canals are protected through international treaties of 
1888 and 1977, declaring both these canals as neutral international waterways. 
CPEC potentially can support the global trading system and likewise may get the 
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status of a transit corridor. This may minimize the threats to CPEC and will make 
it an international asset.
297
  
Compared to Panama and Egypt, Pakistan is in a much stronger 
bargaining position to protect its interests. The diversity of its economy, a large 
production base, and mature diplomatic relations with the rest of the world will all 
come into play. Despite this leverage, however, much like the Panama and Suez 
Canals’ importance vis-à-vis the economies of their host countries, the size of 
CPEC and the investments that have already been promised by China means 
that China can easily match that leverage. Just the initial promised investments 
of $46 billion will account for a large portion of Pakistan’s GDP.
298
 Once the 
economic activity from all projects picks up, CPEC will become an even more 
significant part of the economy. This cushions Pakistan a little from overexposing 
its economy to China’s through CPEC, meaning that any downturn in the 
Chinese economy or global trade will not wholly decimate the economic activity 
created by CPEC.  
The economic impacts of projects like the Suez and Panama Canals are 
self-evident in the numbers. What is hidden, however, is the impact of the 
government, inequality, and “most notoriously” the erosion of the host nations’ 
sovereign rights. These are all part of these projects. Egypt has been a central 
figure in Cold War strategies in the Middle East. Panama has been less fortunate 
in this regard, given its much-diminished status when compared to Egypt. 
Because of the importance of these canals, both countries have developed highly 
service-focused economies, which are linked to their respective canals. This 
means that without a national industrial base on which to develop the 
superstructure for the large financial markets, neither economy has any 
resistance to economic downturns. As a result of this, coupled with the political 
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instability, both countries rank low on the equality indexes and have found it 
difficult to sustain major economic recoveries without outside help.  
Pakistan has already given up a lot to ensure the success of the project. It 
has handed over the strategically important Gwadar Port to the Chinese 
government.299 China may set up a naval presence in Gwadar to protect its 
interests; but there are no similarities between this chain of events and the 
colonial forces sent to Panama and Egypt to defend the canals set up there 
without much regard for the local governments. Besides maintaining regular 
armed forces to protect the sovereignty of the country, Pakistan’s Army has also 
raised two Special Security Divisions, each 12,000 men strong and comprising 
nine army battalions, and six wings of Frontier Corps and Rangers to counter any 
attempt to sabotage the work on CPEC projects.300   
The level of importance of the Suez Canal for developers was evident 
when the developers went to war against Egypt during the 1956 Suez Crisis, 
once access to their project was denied. There is no heart in the chest of 
international affairs. Compelling needs help make allies. American President 
John F. Kennedy said: “Geography has made us neighbors. History has made us 
friends. Economics has made us partners. And necessity has made us allies.”301 
Now the argument is this: will the U.S. go to war if the Panama Canal is 
threatened?  
Against the backdrop of the tumultuous relationship Pakistan has had with 
the West, and its perceived insecurity on the world stage, Pakistan’s embrace of 
China is a logical conclusion. It was only a matter of time before Pakistan turned 
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towards an ally on its border rather than the powerful yet distant (both 
geographically and politically) powers of Europe and America. Given its long 
history and desire of deep relations with the West, however, Pakistan’s position 
on the world stage is a lot more complex than either Panama or Egypt had during 
their journey. It has strong and meaningful relations with several camps and 
international bodies, which cannot be quickly overtaken by any one investor. 
D. CONCLUSION 
CPEC differs from the Suez and Panama Canals, but it shares similarities 
with these projects. The primary difference is that CPEC is a comprehensive 
package of energy, infrastructural and industrial development, in addition to 
being a passage corridor, whereas the canal projects were simply the 
construction of sea passages. The positive indicators of CPEC so far go in favor 
of Pakistan. CPEC projects are still in the development phases, however. 
CPEC’s secret of success will lie in transparency in contracting, right planning, 
timely completion against all challenges, and effective management. Time will 
prove whether fate of the poor man’s life changes with CPEC or not. 
The Suez and Panama Canals both have completed their first century of 
life and have experienced the vicissitudes of their complicated history. Both host 
countries attracted the world’s attention right from the conceptualization of these 
two foreign-funded mega projects, but correspondingly, the life of the common 
person did not see an abrupt change. Arguably, both nations struggled hard to 
break the shackles of colonization and gain control of the canals themselves and 
now are on the path of development with the expansion of both canals. 
Presently, the situations in Egypt and Panama are improving, with economic 
growth making steady progress. The expansions of both the Suez and Panama 
Canals have boosted their economies and improved their geopolitical 
importance. Nevertheless, the century-long revenues collected could not 
eradicate poverty and transform the economies into well-developed ones. Still, 
there is the issue of colonization in Panama. Over 70 years passed between the 
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Panama Canal’s construction and Panama gaining control over it. The U.S. still 
enjoys full rights of intervention militarily if required in light of the Carter-Torrijos 
treaty. The Suez Canal made Egypt a hub of the Cold War in the Middle East 
and most notoriously was denied the sovereign rights. Colossal investment in 
CPEC may increase China’s influence on Pakistani policies and corridors of 
power. Taking into account the said influence, perceived future burden of foreign 
debts, repayments, interest rate, and toll collection, Pakistan significantly needs 
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V. CONCLUSION  
This thesis demonstrates that CPEC will most likely benefit Pakistan. 
Inferences drawn from a comparison with the Suez and Panama Canals suggest 
that CPEC has the potential to generate positive economic growth. As of this 
writing, the project is in its nascent stages; timely completion and proper 
management will be necessary in order for it to bear fruit for Pakistan. CPEC is 
an essential component and flagship project of China’s OBOR initiative. Besides 
energy, infrastructural and industrial developments in Pakistan, CPEC can 
potentially convert Pakistan into an economic hub by using the strategic port of 
Gwadar to attract and benefit regional stakeholders like Iran, Afghanistan, India, 
and the Central Asia States, to develop economic ties with Pakistan.   
A. FINDINGS 
CPEC is China’s investment in Pakistan for economic growth, 
encompassing a couple of development projects of Gwadar Port, energy 
production, industrial and infrastructural developments and the linking of Western 
China’s Region with the Arabian Sea, through the port of Gwadar. Completion of 
CPEC is planned in four phases by 2030.  
China plans to invest $46 billion in CPEC; $33 billion of that investment 
will be spent on hydro, gas, coal, and solar energy projects, which together will 
produce 10,400 MW of electricity and help to end Pakistan's protracted energy 
crisis. The remaining $13 billion will be spent on infrastructure development, 
including Gwadar Port and in the under-developed areas of Pakistan, which 
should attract additional investments and provide a boost to the economy. 
CPEC is faced with numerous challenges on the international, regional, 
and domestic fronts. India is worried about an increase in Chinese naval 
presence in the Arabian Sea, as well as CPEC’s Northern Route, which will pass 
through the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, a concern shared by the 
U.S. The volatile security situation in Afghanistan has spilled over the porous 
 74
border into the adjacent Pakistani provinces of KPK and Baluchistan, through 
which CPEC passes. Iran is in the process of developing its port at Chah Bahar, 
with Indian support, which may be a competitor for Gwadar Port. On the 
domestic front, the challenges identified are security concerns, especially terrorist 
attacks in KPK and Baluchistan provinces, a politically short-sighted approach to 
distributing and prioritizing CPEC projects among the different provinces, and the 
menace of corruption. 
The Pakistani government is pursuing CPEC as a primary national interest 
and is determined that the project will finish on time. The Pakistani Army has also 
raised two Special Security Divisions of 12,000 men, comprising nine army 
battalions, and six wings of Frontier Corps and Rangers for protection of CPEC 
projects from any terrorist attacks.  
As CPEC projects are progressing, Pakistan’s economy has shown 
gradual improvement. A World Bank study has predicted that Pakistan’s 
economy will have annual gradual economic growth of more than 5 percent in 
FY2017 and 5.4 percent in FY20218. Foreign currency reserves in June 2016 
totaled $18.2 billion, up from $13.5 billion in June 2015, where FDI went up from 
$1.88 billion in 2013 to $46 billion in 2015.  
As of this writing, the official long-term plan for CPEC has still not been 
released. Nevertheless, the project has received criticism from scholars and 
media sources, both domestic and international. The critics have raised the 
following questions: Is CPEC’s goal actually to foster Chinese enterprise in 
Pakistan instead of developing Pakistan’s infrastructure and energy system? Will 
CPEC lead to China’s colonization of Pakistan? Will Pakistan be burdened by 
foreign debts? 
Notwithstanding the potential benefits that are likely to accrue due to 
CPEC, there is apprehension of a scenario involving China’s growing influence 
on Pakistan’s economic and foreign policies. On the surface, this appears to be 
logical. It is established beyond doubt that when a country invests colossally, it 
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does have an influence on the beneficiary. For example, Panama and Egypt 
received financial benefits in monetary figures, but they had to face the immense 
influence of the U.S. and Britain.  
Based on what happened in Suez and Panama, some have concluded 
that Pakistan’s policies will be enormously influenced by the Chinese. There is 
not an iota of doubt that Egypt and Panama initially suffered in the aftermath of 
completion of mega projects by the foreign investors. But the question remains, 
why did they suffer? Was the execution of mega projects by foreign investors the 
cause of abject humiliation for these countries? No, the reason was that when 
they signed the contracts with foreign powers, they did not safeguard their own 
independence, dignity, and sovereignty. Overwhelmed by the perception that 
mega projects were going to give them financial benefits, they signed the terms 
and conditions of the contract without much caution, which resulted in 
subjugation for them and later forced them to battle hard for decades to get the 
canals back from colonial powers.  
Pakistan is also facing the same dangers now. While it is extremely 
important for Pakistan to continue the phenomenal project of CPEC, it will be 
extraordinarily significant for Pakistan to bring each term of CPEC under the lens, 
evaluate it painstakingly and microscopically, gauge the manifestation of every 
word, ensure the “same explanation” of terms by both countries, and evaluate the 
perceived future burden of foreign debts and repayments. If Pakistan is able to 
ensure the terms and conditions meticulously, they will likely get maximum 
benefits out of CPEC, and, at the same time, they will not face what Egypt and 
Panama experienced. 
B. AREAS OF FURTHER INTEREST 
While researching CPEC’s benefits and significance for Pakistan, it is very 
likely that this region will become the nexus of another cold war. This could have 
implications for the timely completion of CPEC projects and regional stability. 
This presents two further research questions: What is the impact on regional 
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stability against China pursuing its goal of the OBOR initiative? What could be 
done to protect CPEC through an international treaty, in line with the Suez and 
Panama Canals? The situation in Afghanistan is still not entirely under control; an 
unstable Pakistan would find it difficult to fully support U.S. interests in the region. 
A stable and prosperous Pakistan will efficiently crush the extremist elements 







APPENDIX A.  ENERGY PRIORITY PROJECTS302 
Projects  MW Estimated Cost 
U.S.$ million 
2×660MW Coal-fired Power Plants at Port Qasim Karachi 1,320 1,980  
Suki Kinari Hydropower Station, Naran, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 870 1,802  
Sahiwal 2x660MW Coal-fired Power Plant, Punjab 1,320 1,600  
Engro Thar Block II 2×330MW Coal-fired Power Plant 
TEL 1×330MW Mine Mouth Lignite-fired Power Project at 
Thar Block-II, Sindh, Pakistan  
ThalNova 1×330MW Mine Mouth Lignite-fired Power Project 
at Thar Block-II, Sindh, Pakistan 












Hydro China Dawood 50MW Wind Farm (Gharo, Thatta) 50 125  
300MW Imported Coal-based Power Project at Gwadar, 
Pakistan 
300 600 
Quaid-e-Azam 1000MW Solar Park (Bahawalpur)  1,000 1,320  
UEP 100MW Wind Farm (Jhimpir, Thatta) 100 250 
Sachal 50MW Wind Farm (Jhimpir, Thatta)  50 134  




Karot Hydropower Station 720 1,420  
Three Gorges Second Wind Power Project 




CPHGC 1,320MW Coal-fired Power Plant, Hub, Baluchistan 1,320 1,940  
Matiari to Lahore ±660kV HVDC Transmission Line Project  1,500 
Matiari to Lahore ±660kV HVDC Transmission Line Project  1,500  
Thar Mine Mouth Oracle Power Plant (1320 MW) & Surface 
Mine 
1,320 1,300  
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1 Gwadar East-Bay Expressway 140.60 
2 New Gwadar International Airport 230.00 
3 Construction of Breakwaters 123.00 
4 Dredging of Berthing Areas and Channels 27.00 
5 Development of Free Zone 32.00 
6 
Necessary Facilities of Freshwater Treatment and Water 
Supply 
130.00 
7 Pak China Friendship Hospital 100.00 
8 Technical and Vocational Institute at Gwadar 10.00 
 Total 793.00 
                                            
305 “CPEC Gwadar Projects,” CPEC: China Pakistan Economic Corridor, accessed on 
August 4, 2017, http://cpec.gov.pk/gwader.  
 84




LIST OF REFERENCES 
Abbas, Syed Sammer. “Iran Wants to Be Part of CPEC, Says Rouhani.” Dawn 
News, last modified September 22, 2016. https://www.dawn.com/news/
1285404. 
Abid, Massarrat, and Ayesha Ashfaq. “CPEC: Challenges and Opportunities for 
Pakistan.” Pakistan Vision 16, no 2 (February 2015): 142–169. 
http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/studies/PDF-FILES/Artical-
7_v16_2_2015.pdf.  
AGIL. Zona Paz Economic Corridor Strategy. Abt Association Inc., Guatemala-
CAP Income Generation Activities Project. Guatemala: Abt Association, 
Inc., 2000. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnacy158.pdf   
Ahmed, Munir. “Flipside of CPEC Coin.” Daily Times, May 16, 2017. 
http://ysiddaqui.com/flip-side-of-cpec-coin-by-munir-ahmed-in-daily-times-
16-may-17/. 
Ali, Akber. “China Pakistan Economic Corridor: Prospects and Challenges for 
Regional Integration.” Arts and Social Sciences Journal 7, no. 204 (2016): 
1–5. doi: 10.4172/2151-6200.1000204.  
Ali, Syed Ahtsham, Jahanzaib Haider, Muhammad Ali, Syed Irfan Ali, and Xu 
Ming. “Emerging Tourism between Pakistan and China: Tourism 
Opportunities via China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.” International 
Business Research 10, no. 8 (2017): 204.  
Ali, Waheed, Li Gang, and Mohsin Raza. “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: 
Current Developments and Future Prospect for Regional Integration.” 
International Journal of Research 03, no. 10 (2016): 210–222. 
https://internationaljournalofresearch.com/list-of-volumes/volume-3_2016/
vol-3_issue-10_june_2016. 
Ali, Yousaf, Zaeem Rasheed, Noor Muhammad, and Salman Yousaf. “Energy 
Optimization in the Wake of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).” 
Journal of Control and Decision (July, 2017): 1–19. 
Anwar, Zahid. “Gwadar Deep Sea Port's Emergence as Regional Trade and 
Transportation Hub: Prospects and Problems.” Journal of Political Studies 
17, no. 2 (2010): 97. 
 86
Arif, Muhammad. “Fourth Ministerial Conference of Heart of Asia-Istanbul 
Process Held in Beijing, China.” Nihao-Salam: Pakistan-China Institute 
promoting China Pakistan Economic Corridor. October 31, 2014. 
http://www.nihao-salam.com/news-detail.php?id=NzA2Mw. 
Art, Robert J. A Grand Strategy for America. Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell 
University Press, 2003, p. 45. 
Asgher, Pervaiz.“Suez and Panama Canals – Feats of Human Ingenuity.” 
Pervaiz (blog), September 26, 2017. 
http://pervaizasghar.com/2017/03/suez-and-panama-canals-feats-of-
human-ingenuity/. 
Avais, Muhammad Abdullah, Saima Shaikh, Hakim Ali Mahesar, and Fehmida 
Memon. “China-Pak Economic Corridor: Social Analysis for Pakistan.” The 
Government-Annual Research Journal of Political Science. 5, no. 5 (May 
2016). 
Azfar, Khan Rai Waqas, Naeem Shahzad, and Sadaf Mumtaz. “Application of 
Lean Agile Resilient Green Paradigm Framework on China Pakistan 
Economic Corridor: A Case Study.” Mehran University Research Journal 
of Engineering & Technology 36, no. 3 (2017). 
Baccelli, Oliviero, and Roberto Zucchetti. “The New Suez Canal: Economic 
Impact on Mediterranean Trade [Chapt. 6].” (2015): 145–177. 
Bafoil, François, and Lin Ruiwen. Re-examining the Role of Transport 
Infrastructure in Trade, Regional Growth and Governance: Comparing the 
Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) and Central Eastern Europe (CEE). 
Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 29, no. 2 (February 2010): 73–
119.  
Barber, Christopher Ernest. “The Pakistan-China Corridor: A New Project Will 
Give Pakistan the Tools of Globalization. Will It Use Them?” Diplomat. 
February 27, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/the-pakistan-china-
corridor/. 
Beaton, Kimberly, Metodij Hadzi-Vaskov, and Jun Kusumoto. Panama Selected 
Issues. No. 17/106. International Monetary Fund, May 2017. 
https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/CR/2017/cr17106.ashx. 
Bernstein, Richard. Why the Allied Victory was Not a Sure Thing. The New York 
Times, April 19, 1996. http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/19/books/books-
of-the-times-why-the-allied-victory-was-not-a-sure-thing.html.   
Beta. “World Oil Transit Chokepoints.” Accessed on November 14, 2017. 
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/. 
 87
Bhattacharjee, Dhrubajyoti. “China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).” Indian 
Council of World Affairs Issue Brief, May 12, 2015, 2–15. 
http://www.icwa.in/pdfs/IB/2014/CPECIB12052015.pdf.  
Bhattacharyay, Biswa N., Masahiro Kawai, and Rajat Nag, eds. Infrastructure for 
Asian Connectivity. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012, 187.  
BRC Research Report No. 8, Bangkok Research Center, IDE-JETRO, Bangkok 
Thailand (2012). http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Brc/
08.html. 
Broms, Bengt. The Legal Status of the Suez Canal. Helsinki: Vammala, 1961. 
Brunner, Hans-Peter. What Is Economic Corridor Development and What Can It 
Achieve in Asia’s Subregions? (August 6, 2013). Asian Development Bank 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 117. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2306801.   
Central Intelligence Agency. “The World Fact Book: Panama.” Updated on 
October 19, 2017. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/pm.html  
Chansoria, Monika. “China Makes Its Presence Felt in Pak Occupied Kashmir.” 
Sunday Guardian. http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/china-
makes-its-presence-felt-in-pak-occupied-kashmir. 
Cheng Alvin, and Hin Lim. “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor One Year on 
– Analysis.” Eurasia Review, May 16, 2016. 
http://www.eurasiareview.com/16052016-the-china-pakistan-economic-
corridor-one-year-on-analysis/.  
Chinese Policy Bank Loans – China Investment Research. Accessed on June 
13, 2017. http://www.chinainvestmentresearch.org/special-feature/may-
2015-chinese-policy-bank-loans/. 
Chowdhury, Debasish Roy. “Pakistan Happy to Aid in China’s Quest for Land 
Route to the West; India, Not So Much.” South China Morning Post, last 
modified November 19, 2013. http://www.scmp.com/business/
commodities/article/1359761/pakistan-happy-aid-chinas-quest-land-route-
west-india-not-so. 




Commission on America’s National Interests. America’s National Interests. 
Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, July 
2000, p. 15. 
CPEC: China Pakistan Economic Corridor. “Peshawar-Karachi Motorway (Multan-
Sukkur Section).” Accessed on June 2, 2017. http://cpec.gov.pk/project-
details/29. 
“CPEC Project A Game Changer For The Region: Nawaz.” Daily Capital, 
October 2, 2015. http://dailycapital.pk/cpec-project-a-game-changer-for-
the-region-nawaz/.  
Dogar, Saad Ahmed. “Four Reasons Why CPEC Will Not Be Another East India 
Company.” The Express Tribune, January 03, 2017. China Radio 
International CRI. http://www.cpecinfo.com/cpec-news-detail?id=ODkz. 
Economy Watch. “Egypt's Need for Sharm el-Sheikh was Clear.” Accessed on 
November 14, 2017. http://www.economywatch.com/features/Egypts-
Need-for-Sharm-el-Sheikh-was-Clear1110.html.  
Esteban, Mario. “The China-Pakistan Corridor: A Transit, Economic or 






Express Tribune. “Chinese Pressure Sees Pakistan Mull Constitutional Status of 
Gilgit-Baltistan.” January 7, 2016. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1023523/
chinese-pressure-sees-pakistan-mull-constitutional-status-of-gilgit-
baltistan/. 
Fanack. “Economy of Egypt.” November 14, 2017. 
https://fanack.com/egypt/economy/. 
Fazil, Muhammad Daim. “Pakistan: What Stands in CPEC’s Way?” 
http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/pakistan-what-stands-in-cpecs-way/. 
Ghazanfar, Saima. “Operation Zarb-e-Azb: Two Years of Success.” Nation, 
September 6, 2016. http://nation.com.pk/national/06-Sep-2016/operation-
zarb-e-azb-two-years-of-success. 
Haider, Irfan. “Parties Pledge to Take Full Political Ownership of CPEC.” Dawn 
News. Last modified May 28, 2015. https://www.dawn.com/news/1184733. 
 89
Haider, Mateen. “Army’s Special Security Division to Protect Chinese Workers in 
Pakistan.” Dawn News, April 21, 2015. http://www.dawn.com/news/
1177322. 
Haider, Mateen, and Mahnoor Bari. “Chabahar Not a Rival to Gwadar, Iranian 
Envoy Tells Pakistan.” Dawn News. Last modified May 27, 2016. 
https://www.dawn.com/news/1261006.  
Haider, Muhammad Zarrar. “Maritime Prospects of China Pakistan Economic 
Corridor.” Defence Journal 18, no. 10 (05, 2015): 27–29. 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/168
7839106?accountid=12702.  
Harlow, Barbara, and Mia Carter, eds. Archives of Empire: Volume I. From the 
East India Company to the Suez Canal. Vol. 1. London: Duke University 
Press, 2003. 
Hassan, Ammad. “Pakistan's Gwadar Port Prospects of Economic Revival.” PhD 
diss., Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2005. 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/2138. 
History Channel. “Panama Canal: History.” History Channel. Accessed October 
23, 2017. http://www.history.com/topics/panama-canal. 
Huang, Bwo-Nung, Ming Jeng Hwang, and Chin Wei Yang. “Causal Relationship 
between Energy Consumption and GDP Growth Revisited: A Dynamic 
Panel Data Approach.” Ecological Economics 67, no. 1 (August 2008): 
41–54. 
Human Development for Everyone. UNDP Human Development. Report 2016, 
1–4. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-
notes/PAK.pdf.  
Husain, Ishrat. “Financing Burden of CPEC.” Dawn News. Accessed on October 
22, 2017. https://www.dawn.com/news/1313992. 
Hussain, Jamal. “China Pakistan Economic Corridor.” Defence Journal 19, no.6 
(Jan 2016): 13–21. ProQuest (1768622920). 
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1768622920/
fulltextPDF/E9CD1F07870544A1PQ/1?accountid=12702.  
Husain, Khurram. “CPEC: Is there Cause for Alarm?” Dawn News. 
Updated March 16, 2017. https://www.dawn.com/news/1320670. 
Husain, Khurram. “Exclusive: CPEC Master Plan Revealed.” Dawn News. 
Updated June 21, 2017, 02:17 pm. https://www.dawn.com/news/1333101. 
 90
Irshad, Muhammad Saqib, Qi Xin and Hamza Arshad. “One Belt and One Road: 
Dose [sic] China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Benefit for [sic] Pakistan’s 




Ibrahim, Fouad N. Egypt: An Economic Geography. Vol. 1. London: IB Tauris, 
2003. 
Iqbal, Ahsan. “Debunking Myths on CPEC.” The Express Tribune, May 25, 2017. 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1418270/debunking-myths-cpec/. 
“Infrastructure.” Merriam-Webster.com. Accessed November 21, 2017. 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/infrastructure. 
Jamal, Umair. “If China Does Build a Naval Base in Pakistan, What Are the Risks 
for Islamabad?” The Diplomat, June 24, 2017. 
https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/if-china-does-build-a-naval-base-in-
pakistan-what-are-the-risks-for-islamabad/. 
Johnson, Christopher K. “President Xi Jinping’s ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative.” Center 
for Strategic & International Studies. Last modified March 2016. 
https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/
160328_Johnson_PresidentXiJinping_Web.pdf.   
Kamel, Muhammad, Ali Montaser, and Ibrahim Abd El-Rashid. "Public Private 
Partnership in Egypt." In Proceedings of Canadian Society for Civil 
Engineering Annual Conference (CSCE 2017), 6th CSCE/CRC 
International Construction Specialty Conference, At Vancouver, BC, 




Kenawy, Ezzat Molouk. “The Expected Economic Effects of the New Suez Canal 
Project in Egypt.” European Journal of Academic Essays 1, no. 12 (July 
2015): 13-22. http://euroessays.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/EJAE-
315.pdf.  
Kiani, Khaleeq. “With a New Chinese Loan, CPEC is Now Worth $51.5bn.” Dawn 
News. Updated September 30, 2016. 
https://www.dawn.com/news/1287040. 
Kiani, Khaleeq. “Poor Infrastructure a Major Hurdle to Growth.” Dawn News. 
Updated September 23, 2013: https://www.dawn.com/news/1044734. 
 91
Khan, Sanaullah. “RAW, NDS Patronizing Terror Groups in Afghanistan, National 
Security Adviser Tells U.S. Envoy.” Dawn News, October 26, 2016. 
https://www.dawn.com/news/1292399. 
Khaliq, Abdul. CPEC—“A 'Game-changer' or Another ‘East India Company’?” 
CADTM – Pakistan. http://www.cadtm.org/Pakistan-CPEC-A-game-
changer-or.   
Liddell Hart. The British Way in Warfare. London: Faber & Faber Limited, 1932, 
99. 
Lim, Alvin Cheng-Hin. “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor One Year On–
Analysis.” Eurasia Review: A Journal of Analysis and News (May, 2016). 
Mahajan, Anilesh S. “Worrying Signals; China’s Growing Investments in Pakistan 
Could Prove To Be a Headache for India.” Business Today, May 24, 2015. 
http://www.businesstoday.in/magazine/focus/china-investments-in-
pakistan-rising-headache-for-india/story/218868.html. 
Markey, Daniel S., and James West. “Behind China’s Gambit in Pakistan.” 
Council on Foreign Relations. Last modified May 12, 2016. 
http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/behind-chinas-gambit-pakistan/p37855. 




Malik, Ahmad Rashid, et al. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: A Game 
Changer. Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies, 2016. 
Mehar, Ayub. “Infrastructure Development, CPEC and FDI in Pakistan: Is There 
Any Connection?" Transnational Corporations Review 9, no. 3 (2017): 
232–241. 
Ministry of Planning Development and Reform, Government of Pakistan. 
Accessed on June 27, 2017. http://cpec.gov.pk/energy. 
Monnoo, Kamal. “CPEC—Myths from Realities.” The Nation, September 27, 
2017. http://nation.com.pk/columns/27-Sep-2017/cpec-myths-from-
realities. 
Naylor, Robin Thomas. Economic Warfare: Sanctions, Embargo Busting, and 
Their Human Cost. Boston: North eastern University Press, 1999. 
 92
Nazir, Maryam. “Macro and Micro Dividends of CPEC: Efforts of Regional and 
International Players to Disrupt the Development in the Region, Its 
Ramifications and Rectifications.” Islamabad Policy Research Institute. 
Last modified November 1, 2016. http://www.ipripak.org/macro-and-micro-
dividends-of-cpec-efforts-of-regional-and-international-players-to-disrupt-
the-development-in-the-region-its-ramifications-and-rectifications.  
Plenge, Johann. Gründung und geschichte des crédit mobilier. H. Laupp, 1903. 
 Perveen, Saima, and Khalil Jehanzeb. “Gwadar-Kashgar Economic Corridor: 
Challenges and Imperatives for Pakistan and China.” Journal of Political 
Studies 22, no. 2 (2015): 351–366. 
http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/pols/pdf-files/1%20-
%20SAIMA_v22_2_wint2015.pdf. 
Rafi, Amna Ejaz. “Chinese President Visit to Pakistan.” Islamabad Policy 
Research Institute (IPRI). http://www.ipripak.org/chinese-president-visit-to-
pakistan/. 
Ramay, Shakeel Ahmad. “China Pakistan Economic Corridor: A Chinese Dream 
Being Materialized through Pakistan.” Sustainable Development Policy 
Institute, 4. Accessed on January 12, 2017. https://sdpi.org/.../China-
Pakistan-Economic-Corridor-(Shakeel-Ahmad-Ramay).pdf 
Raza Syed Irfan. “CPEC Could Become Another East India Company.” Dawn 
News, October 18, 2016. https://www.dawn.com/news/1290677. 
Ritzinger, Louis. “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Regional Dynamics 
and China’s Geopolitical Ambitions.” The National Bureau of Asian 
Research. Last modified August 5, 2015. http://www.nbr.org/downloads/
pdfs/psa/Commentary_Ritzinger_080515.pdf.  
Shah, Saeed. “China's Xi Jinping Launches Investment Deal in Pakistan.” The 
Wall Street Journal, April 20, 2015. https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-xi-
jinping-set-to-launch-investment-deal-in-pakistan-1429533767 
Shaikh, Ji, and Fan. “Prospects of Pakistan–China Energy and Economic 
Corridor.” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews Volume 59, June 
2016, pp. 253–263. 
Shakespeare: Julius Caesar: Act 4, Scene 3, Page 11. 
Safitri, H. “Economic Corridor Policy, Land Concentration and ‘Social Exclusion’: 
Java’s Economic Corridor Policy Implementation, Indonesia.” Agricultural 
and Rural Development (ARD), 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2105/13083. 
 93
Searight, Sarah. ““A Dismal but Profitable Ditch”: The Suez Canal Then and 
Now.” Asian Affairs 47, no. 1 (2016): 99. 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03068374.2015.1129870?nee
dAccess=true. 
Shahbaz. Rana. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Lines of Development – Not 
Lines of the Divide. The Express Tribune, May 5, 2015. Accessed on June 
13, 2017. http://tribune.com.pk/story/887949/china-pakistan-economic-
corridor-lines-ofdevelopment-not-lines-of-divide/.  
Shahbaz, Rana. “Eastern CPEC Route Unfeasible: Report.” The Express 
Tribune, July 26, 2015. Accessed on June 13, 2017. http://tribune.com.pk/
story/926582/economic-corridor-eastern-cpec-route-unfeasible/. 
Shah, Syed Ali. “Militants Gun Down 20 Labourers in Balochistan.” Dawn News. 
Last modified April 11, 2015. https://www.dawn.com/news/1175280. 
Sigler, Thomas J. Global Connections: Panama City as a Relational City. PhD 
diss., The Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA, 2011. 
Singh, Sutinder, and John Mohd Magray. “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 
(CPEC), Its Impacts on Pakistan Economy.” International Journal of 
Innovative Research and Advanced Studies (IJIRAS) Volume 4 Issue 7, 
July 2017. 
Siddiqui, Hussain Ahmad. “CPEC Projects: Status, Cost and Benefits.” Dawn 
News. Last modified July 13, 2015. http://www.dawn.com/news/1194014. 
Siddiqui, Salman. “Pakistan Will Be Paying China $90b against CPEC-related 
Projects.” The Express Tribune. 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1352995/pakistan-will-paying-china-90b-cpec-
related-projects/. 
Smith, Adam. “The Wealth of Nations: Book I: Chapter V.” The Library of 
Economics and Liberty, 1776. 
Stevens Andrew. “Pakistan Lands $46 Billion Investment from China.” CNN 
Money, April 20, 2015. http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/20/news/economy/
pakistan-china-aid-infrastucture/. 
South Asia Terrorism Portal. Accessed April 24, 2017.  
Suez Canal Authority. “Importance of the Suez Canal.” Accessed on September 
29, 2017. http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/English/Pages/default.aspx. 
 94
Twining, Daniel. “As the U.S. Pivots Away, China Bets on Pakistan.” Center for 
Strategic & International Studies. Last modified April 23, 2015. 
www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-26-us-pivots-away-china-bets-pakistan. 
Tracy, Nicholas. A Two-Edged Sword: The Navy as an Instrument of Canadian 
Foreign Policy. Ontario: McGill Queens’ University Press, 2012, 301. 
United States Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering 
Violent Extremism. “Country Reports on Terrorism 2015.” Accessed April 
28, 2017. https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257518.htm. 
Wagner, Christian. “The Effects of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor on 
India-Pakistan Relations.” German Institute for International and Security 
Affairs, SWP Comments 25, April 2016. http://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2016C25_wgn.pdf. 
Weitz, Rockford. Strategic Oceanic Choke Points, Are They Still Important. 
Working paper, Fletcher School of Oceanic Studies, Tufts University, 
December, 2000. 
Wolf, Siegfried O. “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC): Feasibility 
and the Need for an Assessment of India’s Role, SADF Comment.” In 
South Asia Democratic Forum (SADF), 2016. 1-20, 
http://sadf.eu/new/blog/comment-nr-19-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-
cpec-feasibilityneed-assessment-indias-role.  




Wong, Edward, and Mujib Mashalmay. “Taliban and Afghan Peace Officials Have 
Secret Talks in China.” New York Times, May 25, 2015. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/26/world/asia/taliban-and-afghan-
peace-officials-have-secret-talks-in-china.html. 
Ze, Shi. “One Road & One Belt & New Thinking with Regard to Concepts and 
Practice.” Presentation at the 30th Anniversary Conference of the Schiller 
Institute, Frankfurt, Germany. Accessed on August 8, 2017. 
http://newparadigm.schillerinstitute.com/media/one-road-and-one-belt-
and-new-thinking-with-regard-to-concepts-and-practice/. 
Zimmerman. “The New Silk Roads: China, the U.S., and the Future of Central 
Asia,” October 2015. http://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/
zimmerman_new_silk_road_final_2.pdf. 
 95
Zimbalist, Andrew S., and John Weeks. Panama at the Crossroads: Economic 
Development and Political Change in the Twentieth Century. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1991. 
  
 96
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
  
 97
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
